THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Worker-Priests with a New Look

In July 1959 Pope John XXIII, in a letter to Cardinal Feltin, Archbishop of Paris, banned the 'worker-priests', then some eighty strong. *The Times*, for epitaph (but hardly epigrammatically), described the movement as 'a gallant failure in the field of modern social problems'. At about the same moment the Church Assembly voted a first grant of £2,500 for the payment and expenses of an officer to extend the work and numbers of Industrial Chaplains. Has our Church once more jumped on a band-waggon just as it grinds to a halt? Or, true to its real nature, has it again found a more excellent way? The answer will depend on how far we profit by Rome's mistakes, and how clearly we perceive the difference between our Ministry and that of the Roman Church, in France or anywhere else.

The first error, mentioned by the Pope, is the attempt by a priest 'to identify himself' with industrial workers, or, we would add, with their employers. Either he shares in the struggle for more wages or better profits, which were undesirable—although we need not with the Pope grandiloquently label it 'the class struggle'; or he stands aloof from money matters, which makes identification impossible. The Reverend G. F. Woods, a lecturer at Cambridge who served his curacy in Doncaster, long ago propounded the view that a clergyman, in his professional capacity, was unique in that his job was to have no job, that he might mediate wholeness to men in every job. So far our few Industrial Chaplains have properly approached industry plainly for the clergymen they are, drawing their keep from independent sources.

The parish the nub

The second error is to divorce evangelism in industry from the mission, life and worship of the parish. In this we have not been so blameless. The first and best known of our Industrial Chaplains, who is one no longer, has been very vocal in denigrating the parish and its clergyman as out of date,

out of touch, and out of luck. In wider circles there is much heady talk of a middle-class church alienated from the industrial masses, although in most industrial parishes that we know the churchwardens are charge-hands, shop stewards, and the like. All this does not trouble the experienced parish clergyman, who knows that the radical alienation is from the demands of the Gospel and is well aware of his own limitations in preaching it. But it could defeat the purposes of the Industrial Chaplaincy. Enlightened employers thirty years ago abandoned the conceit that they could, or profitably should, provide for their employees' whole welfare and leisure in and by the factory.

Fortunately better sense is likely to prevail. The Archbishop of York, speaking to the Church Assembly, described the Industrial Mission as one

> 'of a preliminary and preparatory kind, a mission of men who got right alongside the people—who got inside their mental outlook and then, by talking to them, and praying with them on their own ground, walked with them—towards the truth which was in Christ.'

He saw one great need to be 'a far greater sense of mutual understanding and dependence' between the industrial and parochial mission. This common-sense has been repeated by the Reverend Michael Brooke, Industrial Chaplain in the Manchester Diocese. In defining the work of such a Chaplain, Mr. Brooke said,

> 'he must not go into industry to recruit for the churches. He must have no truck with all the various activities which go under the heading of "evangelism". The proper place for recruiting for the Church is in the parishes and localities. There is no justification whatever for taking up men's time in the factories.'

Priest and People

But the Pope's most serious concern with the 'worrying phenomenon' of worker-priests was of quite a different order. Such a priest 'found himself in an environment detrimental to his spiritual life and often dangerous to his chastity', and might well 'cease to be a priest'. In a comment, *Il Quotidiano* reported 'that about twenty of them have gone so far as to contract illegal unions'. Here is an underlying concept of the Ministry that for centuries, and from long before the Christian era, has led to the alienation of priest from people. The decisions made in Rome in February this year by which, in effect, priests are withdrawn from the life, leisure and reading of the Italian nation, sharply reinforces this concept. Some part of the need, in our own country, for a new and primitive approach to industry flows from the growth amongst us, not yet too serious, of this same view of the Ministry over the past hundred years. The surest safeguard against anti-clerical 'alienation' is a clergy who, in their spiritual capacity, are answering the same high calling as their people, and who like their people must practice the Christian life in the world as they find it. And the test and guarantee of this is the liberty of the clergy to marry.

Rome's theological solecism is to suppose that the admonition 'to be in the world but not of it', which is truly addressed to all Christians, is rather an injunction laid upon her ministers and Orders in relation to the lay Christian world about them.

Dressing by the right

For us, as for Luther, be we clergy or laity, the world is our monastery. But just because we have a professional clergy, there will always be a drift towards the opposite view. The sumptuary Canon, for example, has been retained by our revisers of the Canons, and as first submitted by them was redolent of the archaisms beloved of a self-conscious clerisy. The Upper House of Canterbury, as so often to the rescue, hacked away two-thirds of the mock-Gothic tracery and let in some light through what was left. But it had been better quietly to drop this instruction on dress. A chief complaint to be made of our revisers is that, like the assiduous George III in his dealings with the American colonials, they seem to be congenitally incapable of quietly dropping anything.

An Eirenic Broadcast

On February 23 the B.B.C. broadcast a discussion on episcopacy between the Bishop of Woolwich and Principal Huxtable, a Congregationalist, of New College, London. It turned out to be one of the clearest illuminations for some years of the position now reached on the long road to reunion. The Bishop's analysis of episcopacy was masterly, and liberal and oecumenical in setting and direction, whilst the critical commentary from the Principal was quiet in manner but strong in substance. Inevitably, not all will agree with all that was said in so wide and serious a conversation; and if we cavil at one suggestion made it is only because it is a proposal much aired to-day.

The Bishop, heard with sympathy by the Principal, suggested the creation of many more bishops, at below the diocesan level, perhaps at that of the rural deanery. Only over such a smaller area could a bishop exercise his chief function, to be the pastor and a father in God of clergy and laity alike. He went so far as to see the relation of a bishop to his people as like the relation between God and man, and we find this living image less tolerable and more dangerous than a graven one.

In similar strain, the Bishop of Llandaff last November wondered regretfully

> 'how we would have been placed to-day if, for example, twelve dioceses had been made in Wales, if deans and chapters had been abolished and the Bishops had returned to the proper use of the cathedrals as their own churches in which they were surrounded by their own officers, with the vicar and clergy of the cathedral concerned, all praying and planning together the work of the Church in the Diocese.'

If the disastrous fall in the number of clergy be not arrested, and if the present growing return to the Church prove but transitory, then indeed we may be forced back to what seems to have been the pattern of organisation at the beginning of the second century. But the Bishop of Llandaff implied belief in some peculiar spiritual efficacy attaching to bishops, and the unique pastoral powers ascribed to them by the Bishop of Woolwich, are difficult to square with the latter's own cool analysis of the office—though it is true there was a hint of mystique and a faltering of logic when the Bishop of Woolwich dwelt on the idea of the historic episcopate. If our Church is ever reduced to a series of Portseas, why should it be supposed that these units will be the more efficacious because their incumbents are called bishops? Is it not precisely our difficulty to know whether those in charge of the sub-Apostolic Portseas should be regarded as bishops or presbyters?

Many Bishops, no Priests

And if a sufficiency of bishops is to be created so that they may exercise a direct pastoral care of the laity, what place, function and spiritual status are left for the priest? The contemporary wave of sentimentality about bishops is largely a lingering liking for a lord in an aggressively egalitarian society that seeks to reject the aristocratic principle, and rightly fears the consequences. This adulation threatens to erode the rock of Order on which episcopacy, in more than one form, can firmly stand. A bishop, or a Moderator, wields his authority, as the Bishop of Woolwich remarked, over a number of churches. He has a most important pastoral function, but it is one he exercises both with and through the priests or ministers of those churches. It is to priest or minister that the direct pastoral care of the laity normally belongs, and in his own right. 'My cure I give; thy cure receive.' This is an extreme form of episcopacy: it is also the credential of a priest.

The Next Step

The broadcast ended with a striking and imaginative plea from the Bishop for an immediate period of inter-communion under conditions which would ensure that informed fellowship already existed between the churches concerned. One of the conditions was that the celebration should be shared by a priest or minister from each of the churches. We hope that much more will be heard of this courageous proposal, and meantime would urge all clergy and educated laity to read and ponder this broadcast when it appears in *The Listener*, as we hope it will.

THE POLEMICAL AGNOSTIC

By Professor Basil Willey, F.B.A.

Dr. Bibby has timed the appearance of this book[1] admirably, for in 1959 —the centenary year of the *Origin of Species*—the whole world has been thinking about Darwin, and consequently of his 'Bull-Dog' also. But Huxley was much more than Darwin's defender and popularizer: he was a very eminent Victorian in his own right, and it was high time that somebody undertook to re-assess him. This Dr. Bibby has now admirably done, basing his work upon a seven-year study of the sources (including many hitherto unpublished letters, note-books and diaries, as well as official records).

It is Dr. Bibby's view that although Huxley made most noise in the fields of scientific and theological controversy, he made most difference in the field of education. He therefore devotes the largest section of his book to his account of Huxley as educator. Many of us, if asked which of the great Victorians gave most thought to education, might have said Newman or Matthew Arnold. But after reading Dr. Bibby on Huxley as member of the London School Board, as inspirer of the South Kensington projects, as Rector of Aberdeen, as lecturer, examiner, and indefatigable propagandist and controversialist, one hesitates to award Huxley anything short of the first place. Himself a born teacher and leader, he dedicated the greater part of his splendid energies, and most of his incredibly busy life, to promoting the sort of education he believed in. It may be that Huxley's celebrity in these wider fields has led us (or at least those of us who are not scientists) to undervalue his importance in his own province of biology. We read and enjoy his *Collected Essays*, and form our idea of him from these, but we easily forget his pioneer-researches in comparative anatomy, morphology, or palaeontology, and his innumerable learned papers on technical scientific subjects. His friend J. D. Hooker, alarmed at the dissipation of Huxley's powers, and afraid that he was giving up to mankind what was meant for science, besought him to stick to Natural History. Perhaps, if he had, he might have made a few more discoveries than in fact he did. But nobody can seriously wish him other than he was: the most intelligent, humane and versatile of the nineteenth-century English scientists.

It is, in the first place, Huxley's sheer intellectual brilliance and many-sidedness that distinguishes him from his scientific contemporaries. Darwin, Hooker and A. R. Wallace all acknowledged his superiority, and felt themselves infantile in his presence. And no wonder, for which of these honest plodders, each absorbed in his lifelong specialism, could

[1] *T. H. Huxley, Scientist, Humanist and Educator.* By Cyril Bibby. (Watts, 1959. 25/-.)

have written (for example) the book on Hume in the 'English Men of Letters' series? Which of them had read Sir William Hamilton in boyhood to find out what would become of things if their qualities were taken away? Or had gone on through Carlyle to German philosophy? Darwin, as everyone knows, took no interest in metaphysics or theology; finding all that sort of thing puzzling and boring, he thrust it aside as no concern of his. But to Huxley the philosophy of science, and its metaphysical foundations, were meat and drink; and as for the science-and-religion question, he recognized this for what indeed it was—the central problem of the age, and spent himself throughout life in smiting the Amalekites of superstition, error and obscurantism. Huxley's Amalekites were almost always Churchmen and eminent Christians, so it is not surprising that his name stank in the nostrils of the conventionally orthodox. When he was first put up as a candidate for the Aberdeen Rectorship, a correspondent wrote in the *Aberdeen Free Press*:

> 'If all men of character and culture are shocked at the coarse profanities of Bradlaugh, . . . they have still greater reason to shudder at the deeper and darker blasphemies . . . of that nest of scientific infidels, of which Darwin, Huxley and Tyndall form the select committee.'

In all this mental fight Huxley drew his strength from two kinds of superiority: the intellectual and the moral. On the intellectual side, he was generally better-informed, more skilful in argument and more effective in style than his opponent. Whether he was taking up the cudgels against the Bishop of Oxford, or Dean Wace, or Mr. Gladstone, or the Duke of Argyll, he always knew his antagonist's moves in advance, and had studied the territory behind the enemy lines (the latest textual analysis of the Synoptic problem, the Mosaic cosmogony in relation to geology, etc., etc.). On the moral side, there was his single-hearted devotion to truth, and the well-known purity of his life.

Why was this greatly-gifted and good man not 'on the side of the angels'? The answer to that question is to be sought in the state of the angelic economy in the mid-Victorian epoch, as well as in Huxley's own upbringing and character. It is not always remembered that in his earliest years he was subjected to a strict Evangelical discipline; it was against that sort of religion, then, that he first reacted. Next, Carlyle taught him to hate shams, and taught him also that one could have religion without theology. Finally, his inborn love of truth found its deepest satisfaction in Science, and this was his true 'conversion'. From this newly-gained standpoint the Church appeared as an antiquated obstruction barring his way. Wherever he turned, he found notice-boards marked 'No Thoroughfare. By Order. Moses.' 'Moses' soon turned out to be himself a figment, and close upon the heels of this discovery came Darwin's *Origin*. Writing about Darwin in 1860, Huxley discloses, by the warmth of his lan-

guage, the state of his mind and heart at that early date. He is exasperated to think that 'the mythology of the rude inhabitants of Palestine', the 'semi-barbarous' Hebrews, is still the 'incubus of the philosopher and the opprobrium of the orthodox'; he deplores the waste and scandal of 'the attempt to force the generous new wine of Science into the old bottles of Judaism'. But the 'philosophers' need not worry: 'the majesty of Fact is on their side, and the elemental forces of Nature are working for them. Not a star comes to the meridian at its calculated time but testifies to the justice of their methods—their beliefs are "one with the falling rain and with the growing corn" '. The history of every science is the history of the progressive elimination of 'creative interferences with the natural order'—that is, elimination of the miraculous and supernatural. But the Church not only still clings to these things, but bases its whole structure of belief upon them; the Church therefore is the enemy of truth. In his short Autobiography, Huxley says that his aims in life have been: the advancement of science and its application to all the problems of life; 'veracity of thought and action'; the removal of all the make-believe with which pious hands have tried to cloak the face of truth; and 'untiring opposition to that ecclesiastical spirit, that clericalism, which in England, as everywhere else, and to whatever denomination it may belong, is the deadly enemy of science'.

The extracts and phrases just quoted illustrate the high moral tone of Huxley's polemic against orthodoxy. He habitually used the overtones of religion and the imagery of the Bible to undermine the authority of both. 'Smiting the Amalekites' means attacking the enemies of the Chosen People (the scientists); and it was with the exclamation, 'The Lord hath delivered him into mine hand', that Huxley rose, at the notorious Oxford meeting of the British Association, to administer the *coup de grace* to Bishop Wilberforce. He transfers to the words 'Nature' and 'fact' the numinous quality, the aura of reverence, formerly associated with the great emotive words of religion. Thus the tree of education, he urges, is at present upside-down; instead of being rooted in a literary soil, its roots ought to be 'solidly embedded among the facts of Nature, and draw thence a sound nutriment for the foliage and fruit of literature and of art'. The scientific counterpart to the Christian surrender to God's will (he tells Kingsley in a letter) is 'sitting down before fact as a little child'. In like manner Huxley uses (perhaps not always with conscious intent, but always with telling effect) various rhetorical devices in order to weight the scales in favour of science and against religion, Thus Philosophy and Theology become the two ugly sisters, and Science Cinderella: the former bicker over things they know nothing about, while Cinderella, modestly aware of her ignorance of high matters, busies herself in making the fire and getting the dinner. Or take this version of man's pithecoid ancestry:

> 'thoughtful men, once escaped from the blinding influences of traditional prejudices, will find in the *lowly stock* from whence man has sprung the best evidence of the splendour of his capacities; and will discern, in his long progress through the past, a reasonable ground of *faith* in his attainment of a nobler future' [my italics].

This heroic tone, this assumption of moral superiority, were not a mere pose on Huxley's part. He, like other devout agnostics of his time, could really feel that he was performing (as he said) 'a public war-dance against all sorts of humbug and imposture'. To such a pass had centuries of Erastian security, bibliolatry and dogmatic slumber brought the Establishment, that its supporters could plausibly be shown up as creatures of the night fleeing in panic before the glorious sunrise of Truth.

Huxley has explained how he came to invent the term 'Agnostic'. When he joined the Metaphysical Society, he found himself surrounded by '-ists' of various kinds, all holding strong views about matters on which, as it seemed to him, no evidence was available. So, since a label seemed obligatory, he called himself an agnostic, meaning one who does not profess knowledge where proof is lacking or where evidence is insufficient. Mr. Walter E. Houghton, in a valuable article published in the *University of Toronto Quarterly* (January 1949)[1], distinguished between 'polemical' and 'real' agnosticism, and suggested—I think rightly—that Huxley's was of the former kind. A real agnostic is, or may be, one who seeks but cannot find God; one to whom doubt is painful; one who longs for an assurance which is denied him. Such an agnostic was Henry Sidgwick, and perhaps Thomas Hardy. Huxley, on the other hand, constantly used his agnosticism as a controversial gambit, a device which enabled him again and again to slip through his enemies' fingers. It worked somewhat like this: 'You say I am a mere materialist, believing in nothing I cannot see or touch or analyse in a test-tube. But how can I be a materialist, when I don't know what "matter" is, or whether it even exists? Again with miracles: there is no *a priori* impossibility about these. If something occurs which is outside experience, or which seems contrary to an established natural law, then the law must be widened to include it and account for it. If you ask me to believe in any particular alleged miracle, all I ask is conclusive evidence that it occurred. The Resurrection of Jesus Christ, for example? True, I disbelieve in this at present, but why? Only because the evidence for it is conflicting and insufficient, and of a kind which no scientist or lawyer could take seriously in matters falling within their spheres. The Future Life? Give me one shred of proof, and I'll believe it gladly. I disbelieve in Jesus Christ altogether, you say? "Tell me, first, what Jesus can be proved to have been, said, and done, and I will say whether I believe him, or in him, or not".'

[1] 'The Rhetoric of T. H. Huxley.'

In all this Huxley reminds us strongly of Hume—of that Hume, who, after showing that our belief in the external world, in the order of nature and in the regularity of causation, is incapable of rational demonstration, goes on to disprove miracles as violations of natural law. Hume was only a sceptic in his study. And Huxley was only an agnostic when it suited his argument to appear one; he had no doubts about the sort of Truth attained by science. Science, he said, aims to extend the domain of matter and force, and to expel 'spirit' and 'spontaneity' from our conception of the world. This was what he really believed in, and it is unimportant that he could also say (as he did) that he had no idea of what 'matter' or 'force' could be 'in themselves'. The point was that, whether or no materialism as a philosophy were 'true', its hypotheses were the only ones which science could fruitfully use. Similarly, Huxley elsewhere explains that nineteenth-century science does not flatly and simply deny the existence of any 'Supernature': it merely finds insufficient ('ridiculously insufficient') the evidence for any extant form of supernaturalism. Here again he speaks from the head; his heart speaks when he adds, in a footnote, that personally he sees no warrant for cutting the universe in half, and labelling one half natural and the other supernatural.

Huxley's Cinderella knew that the foundation of morality is to have done with all lying, and it was because he believed that science was morally uplifting, as well as intellectually enlightening, that he worked so hard and so effectually for its inclusion in school and university curricula. Nothing could so effectively foster habits of veracity and honesty as 'sitting down before fact as a little child'. Moreover, a child's first questions are about things, not words, and it is by learning at first hand about the things around him that his mind can best be strengthened and developed. We are told that science cannot confer 'culture', and Matthew Arnold talks about 'criticism of life'; but it is not only literature—still less philology—that can produce these desirable results. How are we to criticize life if we know nothing of what science has done since the Renaissance, and above all in the last century, to revolutionize our picture of the world? Modern humanists speak as if we were still living in the sixteenth century, when Latin and Greek were indeed the keys to the best available wisdom. An exclusively scientific education, to-day, would be as valuable culturally as an exclusively classical one, for it would develop the 'habit of appealing directly to Nature'—to that Nature of which Huxley often speaks in tones of near-religious reverence. Yet Huxley did not advocate an exclusively scientific education; on the contrary, his plea was for a balanced curriculum (not unlike the one now realized at Keele) based upon four main disciplines: Natural Science, History, Economics and English Literature. Sociology, which teaches the natural laws of social phenomena, should be included; also moral education, 'the fashioning of the affections and of the will into an earnest, loving desire to move in harmony with those

laws'. He would even impart what to him was the essence of religion: 'love of some ethical ideal to govern and guide conduct'; and, what was amazing to many of his opponents, he advocated using the Bible, at any rate for the present, as a channel of moral instruction in schools. Because it is not infallible, and because it contains so much theology and legend, need we throw it away? Where else can we find a repository of material possessing such perennial ethical, historical and literary value?

To one who, like the present writer, has a vested interest in English Literature as a University subject, it is encouraging to find Huxley, long before English was recognized as academically respectable, vigorously upholding its educational value: 'If an Englishman cannot get literary culture out of his Bible, his Shakespeare, his Milton, neither, in my belief, will the profoundest study of Homer and Sophocles, Virgil and Horace, give it to him.' The old classical curriculum too often fails to produce the celebrated 'culture', of which it supposedly holds the monopoly; and it fails because it is *not* truly literary: it is grammatical and philological, that is, scientific, but without the great advantage of natural science—its contact with real things rather than mere words. It is also encouraging to a Professor of English at Cambridge, where literature has traditionally been studied in relation to its background of life and thought, to find Huxley regarding the literature of a people as 'a chapter in the development of the human mind', and recommending its study along with 'collateral references to morals and politics' and whatever else may help to bring to life the civilization from which it sprang.

It was only seventy years ago that Huxley called Science a Cinderella, yet how differently she appears now! There is no need any longer to fight for the recognition of science or its inclusion in school and university curricula; that phase of Huxley's battle has been won. But the ideal of a balanced, all-round education is still far from realization, and its promoters may still look to him for inspiration and guidance. What, on the other hand, shall we say of his anti-clerical, anti-ecclesiastical campaign? Has this Mr. Valiant-for-Truth become a period piece? In a sense, yes; but his valour is only unwanted now because its victory was then so complete. Most of the untenable positions still occupied in his time by Christianity have since been evacuated, and there are few of Huxley's criticisms which are not now taken for granted, alike by theologians and by ordinary believers. No one need now get excited about the Garden of Eden or the Flood, nor even about the Gadarene swine—to which Huxley transferred his attention when he found that after thirty years it was they, not Moses, which were 'blocking his way'. Huxley himself was well aware that within his lifetime great changes had taken place; 'the Churches', he said in 1892, 'have begun to swing at their moorings'. He noticed with approval that whereas twenty-five years previously 'the whole artillery of

the pulpit' had fallen upon the evolutionists, nowadays they were not considered 'too wicked to be permitted to live'. He still felt, nevertheless, that 'in the matter of intellectual veracity, science is already a long way ahead of the Churches', and predicted doom for Christianity if it continued to base itself on miraculous foundations. The Church must somehow achieve an 'honest belief', or perish. Well, we have witnessed in our time several of its attempts in that direction; more has been thrown overboard than perhaps Huxley would have thought possible. For his own part, he was a little suspicious of the kind of 'reconcilers' who 'mix the black of dogma and the white of science into the neutral tint of what they call liberal theology'. He feared that the 'types' and 'allegories' propounded by the *Lux Mundi* group might merely raise a fog. True, he commends these writers for not having closed their ears against the still, small voice of reason, but their position was in his view 'hopelessly untenable'; 'having distilled away every inconvenient matter of fact in Christian history, they continue to pay divine honours to the residue'. What, one wonders, would Huxley have thought of the still more attenuated versions of Christianity produced in recent years by those who have tried to modernize it altogether? Of the de-mythologizers? Of those who turn faith into an act of existential choice or a series of such acts? Of those who, trained in logical positivism, treat sentences containing the word 'God' as moral stories or suasive parables intended to produce in us a disposition, or to confirm us in a decision, to act agapeistically? He ought, we may think, to have approved of these versions as evidence that Christians were following his lead, and affirming nothing but what they could honestly believe. But it is more likely that Huxley, like other critics of religion, would not have welcomed such efforts to salvage faith from the wreckage; he would have preferred to see it disappear altogether.

In 1890 he allowed himself to finish an article by composing an extract from an imaginary Bampton Lecture of the future. It contained this sentence: 'No longer in contact with fact of any kind, Faith stands now and for ever proudly inaccessible to the attacks of the infidel.' What Huxley propounded in irony, our own time has seen put forward in all seriousness; absence of all claim to affirm historical fact has recently been mentioned as an essential condition for the validity of any religious statement. To Huxley, who reverenced fact, and was innocent of linguistic analysis, severance from fact meant death. To 'save' religion by this desperate expedient meant (to use an image of Huxley's, derived from his 'Rattlesnake' days) scuttling the ship itself in trying to get rid of the cockroaches.

Dr. Bibby has done us a good turn in drawing attention to this noble Victorian who awakened his own generation by 'the grasp of a rough lay hand upon its shoulder,' and who combined in himself many aspects of that well-balanced humanity which, in our more fragmented age, we are now trying to re-unite.

IS THERE A NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY?

By Professor S. G. F. Brandon

When it was learned that Professor Alan Richardson was to publish an exposition of New Testament theology, many scholars must have been a little curious as to his line of approach. For any study of the theological thought which finds expression in the New Testament documents inevitably entails consideration of many highly complex issues about which there is much conflict of expert opinion, and Professor Richardson had already shown himself to be a keen apologist.

The book, which has now appeared,[1] reveals itself as an epitome of a certain fashion of theological thinking in some places in this country. Its author boldly proclaims his complete repudiation of what he conceives to be the tradition of liberal scholarship in the study of the New Testament. In turn he claims himself to employ a method of interpretation which he curiously describes as 'a radical gospel criticism by the side of which the liberal orthodoxy of the recent past (including that of the form-critics) appears decidedly conservative' (p. 170). But of what this new revolutionary technique is, is made patent in the following passage: 'This, then, is what is meant by New Testament theology in the title of this book: the framing of the hypothesis concerning the content and character of the faith of the Apostolic Church, and the testing of this hypothesis in the light of all available techniques of New Testament scholarship, historical, critical, literary, philological, archaeological, and so on. Once this definition of New Testament theology has been understood, the objections most commonly levelled against it cannot be sustained. It is objected, for instance, that biblical theology reads into a scriptural text certain dogmatic affirmations and then ignores all inconvenient literary and historical facts; or again, it is objected that it replaces the spirit of impartial scientific enquiry by the temper of the dogmatic theologian, so that the study is precluded because the conclusions are prescribed. Such objections are based upon a misconception of the nature of the scientific method. New Testament theology is "scientific" in just the same way as any other science is scientific: the scientist never starts with an empty mind; he gets a "hunch", frames a hypothesis, and then devises experiments to see whether the observable data can be "seen" better in this new way' (pp. 10-11). A fallacy, productive of serious error, is concealed in this otherwise unexceptionable statement. It lies in the assumed analogy between the nature of the problem of investigating Christian Origins and that of enquiring into some aspect of natural phenomena. In the former we have to do with a human situation, in which human passions and human interests are deeply rooted, in which almost all our information

[1] *An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament*, by Alan Richardson. (S.C.M. Press, London, 1958. Pp. 423. 30/-.)

comes from the tendentious writings of interested parties, and about which a certain interpretation has been established for some eighteen centuries and constitutes the orthodoxy of one of the great religions of mankind. No enquiry into the constitution of natural phenomena has to contend with a similar situation, which is so bedevilled by human passions, documented by data of such *ex parte* a character, and prejudged by a long-established interpretation which represents the religious faith of millions.[2] It may be noted further that a significant clue to this fallacy and its consequences is given in the concluding words of the above quoted statement about framing an hypothesis and devising experiments, 'to see whether the observable data can be "seen" better in this new way'. The crucial words are: 'can be "seen" better in this new way', for what Professor Richardson is concerned to do is to show that what he understands to be the established interpretation of Catholic orthodoxy is the best 'hypothesis' in terms of which the 'data', i.e. the New Testament writings, can be 'seen'. In other words, he is really arguing that what the Church (we may ask 'which Church'?) teaches about the origins of Christianity in its exegesis of the New Testament is the truest interpretation of it. It would be very interesting to know whether Professor Richardson, as a Christian apologist *vis-à-vis* other religions, would accept such a plea from a Buddhist or a Muslim? Such a line of argument would indeed authenticate the claims made on behalf of the Buddha and Mohammed by their respective followers. But one surmizes that, if he were writing in this rôle, Professor Richardson would insist on the necessity of a rigorous enquiry into credibility of the *Dhammapada* or the *Qur'an*, and that he would have much to say about the nature of historical evidence.

It would appear that Professor Richardson endeavours to justify this method of approach on *a priori* grounds, because he wishes to avoid facing the charge, of which he shows himself very sensitive, that 'biblical theology reads into the scriptural text certain dogmatic affirmations and then ignores all inconvenient literary and historical facts'. In other words, if he can claim to find an 'hypothesis' which enables 'more facts to be "seen" in a coherent way' (p. 11), he can ignore those rather awkward facts which his despised 'liberal' scholars so tiresomely occupy themselves with and which lead them to such unfortunate conclusions. That he does do this soon becomes evident in his book. It will suffice to mention three instances of this by-passing of awkward problems, in each of which an issue of basic significance is involved for the proper understanding of Christian Origins. The first is to be found in the complete absence of any

[2]How scientific research has fared when implicated in situations of a somewhat similar character is significantly attested by Galileo's dealings with the Inquisition, the Lysenko controversy, and the mystery that at present attends the true nature of the danger from atomic 'fall-out', despite various official reports.

discussion of the origin and nature of the New Testament documents, and a corresponding neglect to consider the significance of the interplay of forces which led to the ultimate formation of the canon of the New Testament. This omission is serious. Although a simple and clear-cut picture of the origin and development of the New Testament may be desirable and the research of modern liberal scholarship does not provide it, this situation stems from the nature of the evidence itself, and no useful purpose can surely be served by ignoring these difficulties and using these writings at their apparent face-value.

Professor Richardson also disregards the fact that in the New Testament there is abundant evidence of conflict about doctrinal and disciplinary matters, as there is also of the existence of contradictory traditions concerning fundamental issues of fact and interpretation. The most serious aspect of this situation is the conflict between Paul and the leaders of the Church in Jerusalem. This clash was not over peripheral matters of policy concerning the evangelization of the Gentiles, as it has sometimes been (apologetically) represented. It concerned the very essentials of Christology, namely, the nature of Jesus and the significance of his Crucifixion; indeed, so diverse from each other were the interpretations of Paul and his opponents that Paul describes their teaching as 'another Gospel' and represents them as 'preaching another Jesus' (*Gal.* i, 6-9; II *Cor.* xi, 4). We are thus faced with the fact, inconvenient though it may be for the traditional orthodoxy, that Paul testifies to the existence of two rival interpretations of the nature and mission of Jesus in the Church within two decades of the Crucifixion. Moreover, the full significance of the fact must also be recognized in that the 'gospel' of the Jerusalem Church was truly the original tradition of the life and teaching of Jesus as it was taught by the original apostles and 'eye-witnesses', presided over by James, the brother of Jesus. Further, full consideration must be given to the fact that this primitive community of disciples, with their 'gospel', and the unchallengeable prestige of their authority, was completely wiped out in the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in A.D. 70. This obliteration of the Jerusalem Church left the way clear for Paul's 'gospel', or interpretation of Jesus, to become the basis of Catholic Christianity by the end of the first century.

The third instance of Professor Richardson's by-passing of a fundamental issue finds expression in the following statement: 'To those who do not share the liberal outlook it is not a matter of the standing or falling of Christian truth that we should be able to construct, even in principle, an historical outline of the life of Christ. They are not disconcerted to find that St. Luke 'the historian' is turning out to be a more elaborately rabbinical typologist even than St. Mark or St. John! They have come to entertain a rather different conception of the nature of historical testimony or apostolic witness from that which dominates the minds of so many

New Testament scholars from the nineteenth-century pioneers to the late B. H. Streeter on the one hand or the form-critics on the other' (p. 170). Leaving aside for the moment this further bit of caricaturing of the 'liberal outlook' and the invocation of the now blessed word 'typology', it is to be noted that Professor Richardson herein represents a certain contemporary school of theological thought which is characterized by an aversion to bring the Christian case into the forum of historical criticism, while at the same time asserting that it is an historical religion *par excellence*. Accordingly, when faced with some difficult problem of Christian Origins, those who think after this fashion will refuse to admit that the issue can be decided by the use of the accepted *criteria* of historical judgment, and will invoke other *criteria* of an esoteric character derived, according to the prevailing taste, from theology, mysticism, or Jewish typology. On the other hand, undoubtedly because they realize that the Christian claim is based traditionally and ultimately on an appeal to history, they often resort instinctively, if inconsistently, to the authority of allegedly historical fact. Professor Richardson is found constantly doing this. Two typical instances may be cited. After stressing the objective character of the accounts of the Virgin Birth by Matthew and Luke (and this after describing Luke as an elaborate 'rabbinical typologist'!), he maintains: 'The truth is that it is very difficult to suggest any motives which prompted the invention of the story of the Virgin Birth, if it is not an historical fact' (p. 173).[3] Then, significantly, he is found arguing for the credibility of the story of the Empty Tomb: 'That notion that the resurrection of Christ was a purely "spiritual" affair, while his corpse remained in the tomb, is a very modern one, which rests upon theories of the impossibility of miracle drawn from nineteenth-century physics' (p. 196). However, he asserts that 'the body of the Risen Lord in the Gospel accounts is a glorified body (cf. *Phil.* iii, 21); it is clearly set free from the limitations of our mortal bodies'. In trying thus to have the matter both ways, it is significant that Professor Richardson omits all reference to Luke's statement (xxiv, 41-4) that the Risen Lord, in his glorified body, took and ate, and presumably digested, a piece of broiled fish. We may fairly ask how are we to understand Luke in his record of the Resurrection Appearances—as 'the historian' or the 'rabbinical typologist'?

It is here that we surely reach the crux of the whole issue concerning the validity of Professor Richardson's position and that of those who think with him. It is that they will not realistically face the problem of what is meant by the historicity of the Christian religion. To claim that Christianity derives its authority from certain events in Palestine in the first

[3]It should also be noted that in his assertion that the accounts of the Virgin Birth of Christ cannot be paralleled in Hellenistic mythology in the matter of their description of the mode of conception, Professor Richardson overlooks the example of Danäe. And what would he make of the story of the Virgin Birth of the Buddha?

century of the present era inevitably means making assertions about historical events, and this means in turn facing the obligation of showing that the alleged evidence for these assertions is sound in accordance with the accepted canons of historical investigation and judgment. But this task, it must be recognized, finally lands those who honestly undertake it into a morass of possibilities and probabilities, concerning which, on strictly scientific grounds, definitive judgment must be suspended. Now this situation is a well-known one in many fields of historical study, and especially in that of ancient history, where the extant evidence is usually sparse and enigmatic in character. Many examples could be cited; but two suffice by way of illustration: Akhnaton's attempt to reform the religion of ancient Egypt, and the trial and death of Socrates. But now comes the rub. Whereas we can be content with remaining uncertain about the true nature of the teaching of Akhnaton or Socrates and about what exactly happened to them, we cannot be so in regard to Jesus and the beginnings of the Christian Church.

In desperation about being bogged down in the minutiae of historical research and at having to accept strictly scientific verdicts of 'not-proven', it is understandable that many Christian scholars have become restive of the austere discipline of scientific history and have sought other means of maintaining the truth of Christianity—indeed much as Professor Richardson dislikes the methods of Rudolf Bultmann, he is clearly actuated by the same motive which has led the great German scholar to seek a way out of the apparent historical *impasse* by 'De-mythologization'. The temptation is indeed great to lay primary emphasis upon the witness of the primitive Christian experience, as it finds expression in the New Testament, and to eschew all grubbing about with historical issues. But Christianity is not as Buddhism in this respect. The Buddhist can cheerfully say that all historical questions about the life of the Buddha are irrelevant and that the authentication of his faith is to be found in the practice of the Buddhist *Dhamma* or way of life. Christianity, however, cannot thus cut loose from history. The late Professor M. Goguel did indeed wisely write that Christianity originated principally from faith in the resurrected and glorified Jesus.[4] But the matter cannot be left there. It is not enough to study what the first Christians believed about Jesus of Nazareth, because those beliefs embody such essentially historical claims about the Jesus who actually lived and died in Palestine, when Pontius Pilate was the Roman procurator there, that always the question must be asked: what did Jesus actually say and do himself? what really caused the Crucifixion? what really happened after his burial?

These questions are basic, and they cannot be evaded. Neither does it help to malign those liberal-minded scholars who attempt honestly to

[4] *La Naissance du Christianisme* (Paris, 1946), pp. 41 sq. (E.T. *The Birth of Christianity*, pp. 29 sq.).

face them. They do not claim to be able to solve these questions; but they do claim that to face them realistically has its value in helping to provide insight into the true nature of the issues involved. Moreover, their proper evaluation shows that the problems of the origins of Christianity should not be considered in isolation from those which attend the other great religions of mankind. Christianity, after all, did not drop down complete out of heaven; it stemmed from a specific human situation in Palestine some nineteen centuries ago, and it found expression in contemporary concepts and languages and became indelibly moulded thereby. It is not without significance in this context that Professor Richardson, who sets himself to deny all suggestion that nascent Christianity was decisively affected by its Hellenistic environment, while admitting that the *archontes* in I *Cor.* ii, 6-8 are 'the spiritual world-powers', remains silent about the syncretistic character of this fundamental statement of Paul's soteriology.

This review-article has been purposively entitled 'Is there a New Testament Theology?' Professor Richardson's whole case is that there was one such 'Theology', unified, harmonious, authoritative, and accepted, except by a few queer and insignificant heretics. But evidence has already been given that Paul witnesses to the currency of two rival versions of the faith within two decades of the Crucifixion. Moreover, Professor Richardson is significantly silent about the implied censure in *Acts* xviii, 24-8 on Alexandrian Christianity, because of its difference from the Pauline version. It is also of interest to note that the late Dr. Streeter, to whom Professor Richardson makes a disparaging reference in this book, in his magisterial chapter entitled 'The Rise of Christianity' in the *Cambridge Ancient History* (vol. xi), found 'no less than seven main types of approach' in the New Testament, and he questioned the wisdom of disguising the fact of this rich variety of interpretation from the student by the use of the expression 'New Testament Theology'.

It is undoubtedly inevitable that to those who on *a priori* grounds believe that the Christian faith must have been a clear-cut, definitive thing from the very beginning, such findings of liberal scholarship, based upon the accepted standards of historical evaluation, should seem very tiresome and perverse. But those who seek to interrogate the New Testament documents by the same methods and *criteria* as they would employ in investigating the documents of any other historical movement will accept the evidence of this variety of primitive interpretation and study it with interest, not feeling themselves obliged to explain it away in the interests of some pre-conceived notion of what Christianity should originally have been like.

In his *Preface* Professor Richardson says, perhaps to disarm criticism: 'If this book does not help in the task of preaching the faith of Jesus Christ in the second half of the twentieth century, it will have failed in its

purpose; it is not written as an academic exercise.' One can respect the sentiment expressed here, and if the purpose, as stated, had been adhered to, such a lengthy *critique* as that given here would have been unnecessary. But Professor Richardson, whatever his original intention, has made his book 'an academic exercise', and in seeking to justify it gratuitously attacks the tradition of liberal scholarship. In claiming, as he does, that the 'conclusions' of the liberal or 'historicizing' critics have been 'stood upon their heads' (p. 14), he cannot be surprised when he finds that some of those critics, feeling the familiar ground of historical scholarship still firm beneath their own feet, wonder from which way up their work has been observed by Professor Richardson.

EASY DESCENT

By the Rev. C. O. Rhodes, M.A.

Seldom can any civilization have been subjected to such continuous and such minute self-analysis as that of the Western World during the past century. This exaggerated self-consciousness is itself a symptom requiring investigation. Self-examination is a good practice in moderation: it easily becomes a morbid introspection. A man with a mission plans his future: he does not dwell upon his ailments. If he finds himself in that condition, he will very likely get it out of his system by the complete immersion of the consulting room.

With few exceptions, the present tendency of these analysts is to pessimistic conclusions. There is scarcely one who paints a gay picture of the future, and not many who find sufficient positive elements in the contemporary world to justify a chapter. A hypochondriac society grinds inexorably to its doom, boasting its achievements, but expecting no resurrection.

Since Marx we have wished for no more grandiose patterns. That is reasonable enough. Utopia is obsolete. But we do need an axis of social development. We do require an overall strategic conception to direct the movements of the smaller scale sociologists, the politicians, the administrators and the statesmen of industry. Whereas we badly want a vision, the social philosophers are offering us only a Jeremiad. A '1984' that would provide us with hope and a mission instead of a right uppercut to the jaw would itself be revolutionary.

Without them we wallow in the necessities of the Cold War, although the answer to Communism is not a polemic but a purpose. Or we let the logic of the machine mesmerize us with its inevitabilities. The spirit of Man is of immense power and can work miracles, but for lack of an ambition it atrophies. Bright young people say nowadays that they would

like to dedicate their lives to something, but they do not know what. A materially glittering but spiritually drab society provides no great causes worthy of their service. Do even the Aldermaston Marchers really believe they have a chance of achieving their limited and negative aim?

Hannah Arendt, surely one of the ablest and most comprehensive of the social philosophers, has enjoyed a warm reception for her most recent work, *The Human Condition* (University of Chicago and Cambridge University Press, 36/-). It is a very fine, indeed a brilliant, book. She proposes, she says in her Prologue, 'simply to think what we are doing'. Well, it is better to know what we are doing than not to know. To have some idea of what we want to do is better even than that. But Miss Arendt begins by suggesting that the exploration of interstellar space both in fiction and in actuality is nothing less than a repudiation of Mother Earth, whose imprisoning arms have become a major frustration. She concludes that: 'the trouble with modern theories of behaviourism is not that they are wrong but that they could become true, that they are actually the best possible conceptualization of certain obvious trends in modern society. It is quite conceivable that the modern age—which began with such an unprecedented and promising burst of human activity—may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known'.

This is pure Orwell in cap-and-gown. Using the classical *polis* as her standard of comparison, Miss Arendt sets out the alternative life-styles that have successively displaced each other. The *vita contemplativa* has been decisively rejected as an ideal way of life, and does not come in for extensive treatment. The *vita activa* is divided into three: labour, work and action. But these three words are used in a special sense, and Miss Arendt has to make her own definitions.

They describe by means of contrast a phenomenon arising out of the present stage of the dialectic of the development of civilization. The area of human activity covered by biological necessity, which includes everything implied in the term 'our daily bread', family, livelihood, industry, has been socialized. Formerly Man as labourer, the servant of biological needs and part of the metabolic processes of nature, was considered unfree and as such was unrespected. Whether he were master or slave the same was true, since the master was as closely bound to necessity as his slave. The full citizen was he whose leisure and whose freedom were guaranteed by the possession of property. Being liberated in this way, such a man could enter into the life of action, the activity of politics, rendered possible by the infinite variety of human individuality which was the distinction of humanity but meant nothing to Man as labourer. The characteristic of action was speech, whereby men conveyed their individuality and entered into the personal exchanges of which it was the condition. Now action, too, has been absorbed into the social. Politics has become a function of society, and the state its instrument.

Work, according to this definition, differed from labour in respect of permanence. Work did not produce for consumption but for construction, as nowadays does art. The result of work was a world apart from the world of nature, an artifact within which men lived. It did not have to justify itself on immediately utilitarian grounds. It was not so much the servant of biological processes as the means of providing new conditions within which those processes occurred. But this too has become assimilated to the all-devouring society which has either degraded work to the level of labour or *vice versa*: whichever it is, work now produces for consumption, and its most permanent product is a machine tool which is itself consumed in the processes of further production. So we are launched into a cycle from which there is no breaking away.

What has actually happened is that society, in becoming the universal provider and subordinating politics to economics, has so obliterated the previous distinctions that we are now all *animal laborans*, and the only differences are those of degree. We all have to justify our existence on utilitarian grounds. Even the clergyman is expected to offer a satisfactory answer to the agitator's challenge: 'What der yew perdoos?'

Miss Arendt spends a chapter outlining the development in the philosophical attitudes behind these changes. Two streams of thought have encouraged world alienation. Galileo enabled us, as it were, to take our stand in interstellar space and, in that perspective, to see all human endeavour on the scale of the ant-heap, in which there may be much amusement but no differentiation, and nothing but the processes of living. Descartes—and he could hardly be omitted from any polemic against modernity—encouraged the flight from the world to the self: that frowning citadel that stands apart from the struggles of men and observes them with interest but without participation. Science and philosophy between them have taught the unreliability of appearances so that thought and contemplation have lost their independent status and their high valuation and have to justify themselves at the bar of utility. Meditation is at the service of technology and always confronts the question: 'Does it work?'

But the Christian religion has played its part by stressing the value of life for its own sake. Make life itself a good, and immediately the service of biological need leaps in the hierarchy of values. Perhaps Miss Arendt is less aware of the looser Christian thinking of recent years which has jumped on the Socialist bandwagon to talk at large about the dignity of work, when what was really intended was the dignity to which the worker ought to aspire.

Consequently, labour has been dignified, and the activities of contemplation and the conduct of personal relationships degraded so that we have become a labouring society. Miss Arendt remarks that during the course of its struggles what is loosely known as the 'working-class movement' has, in fact, made one of the liveliest independent contributions to politics

in her special sense of the word, since mere interest has been far from its only guiding motive. But in these days that, too, is finding its place as a component of the social machine.

And now, just when labour has reached the height of apotheosis, it is deprived of its function in human affairs by the machine. This is indeed a historical paradox which must make a cynically observing Cartesian *ego* laugh loud and long; if Cartesian *egos* are capable of laughter as well as doubt. What is worse, the elevation of the labouring function and its assimilation to itself of all other functions has failed to achieve that higher form of life for everybody which was prognosticated.

Perhaps none of the numerous disillusions of recent generations has been so poisonously bitter as this. To particularize on the Welfare State: the valid criticism of it is not that of spoon-feeding but that, whereas it should be a platform from which the multitudes of the people reach heavenward, it is in reality a ceiling beyond which the masses cannot rise. The tragedy of our times is that the multitudes are demonstrating themselves the masses, and the people the herd. It is all the more devastating to find that the reasons for this are not so much social or historical as psychological, and therefore apparently insurmountable. The terribly depressing study of mass-communications makes this clear. The labourer, no matter how exalted in status, can become no more than consumer: a labouring society is inevitably a consuming society. It marks no advance of the least spiritual significance that metabolism now occurs with predigested foods drawn from a slot machine in a gilded café to the accompaniment of the treacly strains of the juke box; nor even that it may occur in a council house. There was no intention of sarcastic punning when one of the murkier conurbations chose as its motto, *Labor Omnia Vincit*, but unfortunately there could have been if Miss Arendt is right. When clever young folk nowadays have difficulty in finding causes worthy of their dedication, they must be at least half-conscious of all this.

Hence the decline of the Western Hemisphere, dragging the Eastern with it, into the 'deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known'. Yet we surely cannot accept that as final. To do so would be the sin against the Holy Ghost. Even when the inexorabilities of time have riven our orthodoxy to shreds and tatters, we still cannot fall into that. Perhaps all that remains of that once glittering garment is the assurance: 'Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou suffer thy holy one to see corruption; thou shalt show me the path of life'. There are, indeed, so many elements of potentiality and hope in the present situation that it would seem some way out must be found because it can. We have to ask whether the real treason of the intellectuals in these days does not consist in their preference for dwelling on the elements of despair.

THE CATHOLIC MODERNIST MOVEMENT IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA

By Miloslav Kanak

Part II: The late Nineteenth Century and After

The careers of K. Havlícek Borovsky, the layman, and of F. Náhlovsky, the priest, symbolized the hopes of Catholic reformers as to the future policy of the Church in the Czech lands. It should be more democratic, have more understanding of social problems and be national in outlook; it should take up a positive attitude towards science and culture and should give its priests a better and more progressive education. Up to 1848 there had been many Bohemian Catholic priests, such as Jirsík himself, who were working for the progressive democratization of the Church. As far as the national character of the Roman Catholic Church in our country was concerned at this period, it was quite clear that on the whole the lower ranks of the clergy, who were mostly of Czech origin, were ready to help the national cause of the Czech people. The hierarchy, however, who were mostly of foreign, cosmopolitan and noble origin, had absolutely no understanding for the national cause.

In the years after the revolution of 1848, various cultural Catholic organizations came into existence, such as Skrdle's association 'Vlast' (Native Country) which published a magazine bearing the same name, and was devoted to the propagation of Catholic cultural and scientific work. Its aim was to establish a certain platform for Catholic literary and scientific activities which would serve the cause of both science and the Catholic Church. Unfortunately 'Vlast' soon became apologetic in tone and strongly opposed to Jewish and other non-Catholic influences in Bohemia and Moravia. By the middle of the 1880's it was quite clear that it would be necessary to find new methods of work and to look for new men within the Catholic Church to promote a real understanding of cultural and scientific trends which were making themselves felt among the broad masses of the people. Representatives of this view began to appear among Catholic priests in the early 1890's.

In the year 1892 a young man, J. S. Baar (1869—1925) ,was admitted to holy orders. He later became priest at Klobuky and at Orech and was to exercise a great influence on popular thought as a propagator of social ideas. He was bitterly critical of the social misery into which the Bohemian clergy had fallen and for which he blamed both the clerical hierarchy and the great landowners. In later years he attempted to bring his ideas to the notice of the Papal Curia itself.

In 1893 another young priest was admitted to holy orders. Francis Loskot (1870—1932). His interest lay in the science of religion, and it has been said of him that of all people he tried his best to reconcile the results

of scientific discovery with religion and to prevent hostilities between the Church and science. He was, however, expelled from the Roman Catholic Church and lived for many years the life of a persecuted and slandered individual.

The third member of this group was E. Dlouhy-Pokorny (1867—1936), who was priest and chaplain of St. Henry's Church in Prague and a Christian Democrat of European outlook. His main theme was that Christian socialism should dominate every priest and every church if they really wished to create a better and more just world—the reign of God on earth. But he too was expelled from the Roman Catholic Church.

Due to these new men and to their enlightened efforts, the impact of the Christian Democratic Movement slowly reached the Catholic clergy in our land during the second half of the nineteenth century. This movement brought them into contact with ideas which were beginning to be propagated in other Roman Catholic Churches in Europe. It was at this period that links between Bohemian Catholicism and progressive German Catholicism were established, and this in turn brought the democratic element among the Czech clergy into contact with the new reform movement within the Church known as Modernism.

Catholic Modernism was a new reform movement within the Catholic Church which, from the end of the nineteenth century, aimed at bringing the Church dogmatically as well as in practical matters into touch with methods of thinking which were becoming dominant in all branches of human life. Followers of this reform movement were to be found in Italy, France, Spain, Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary and America. It is associated with names such as A. Loisy, M. de Unamuno and R. Murri; indeed, the modernists included many of the outstanding theologians of the Catholic Church at this period. But the modernist movement, coming into being simultaneously in many countries and in different local conditions, was too spontaneous and too ill-organized. The modernists possessed no central goal nor concerted plan of action. It was a movement of individuals, but these shared a common foundation in attempting to reconcile the necessities of the spirit of the age in which they lived with the claims of religion. Furthermore, it had common impulses in the political, social and scientific activities of that period. Its thought was a continuation of theological and philosophical ideas which had developed from the second half of the eighteenth century, and it was imbued by a spirit of mutual respect and toleration. The modernists believed that it was possible to prevent the development of a conflict between progressive science and conservative religion, and many of its adherents paid dearly for their ideas.

It is quite natural that Catholic modernism in our country had the same characteristic features as modernism elsewhere, but at first it was purely a literary movement, without much influence among the broad

masses of Catholic opinion. The first manifesto of Catholic Bohemian modernism was the poetic symposium published in 1895 by fifty-one Bohemian priests with the title *Under One Banner.* At this stage, the writers were much under the influence of literary personalities of the neo-Christian movement in France, men such as Veuillot, Bloy, Huysmans and Verlaine, and above all Mistral. The aim of this symposium was, in the words of the author, 'to improve Catholic art in our country'. It was therefore a movement completely loyal to the Roman Catholic Church. However, in the next year, 1896, another literary magazine of a rather different character was published called *Novy zivot* (*New Life*), under the editorship of K. Dostál-Lutinov (1871—1923). This journal had a far more outspokenly modernist bias, and it was through its influence that modernism began to spread as a real force in Bohemia and Moravia. At the same time, Czech modernism received a new impulse from another direction. In 1882, the Bohemian University had come into being through the division of the old Caroline University in Prague into German and Czech departments, and this soon became a focus for Czech historical studies. Up to that time these studies had tended to have a strong pro-Austrian bias, but now Czech history was studied in its own right, and a school of nationally-minded Czech historians associated with the name of J. Goll became established.

It became quite obvious that this new evaluation of national traditions must extend to the field of religion. The conflict between science and religion would ultimately be extended to the field of historical research. The new school aimed at evaluating national history round the endeavours and ideals for which J. Huss and his followers had fought. It became perfectly clear that whoever started to consider Czecho-Slovak history from that standpoint would soon come into conflict with the dominant Roman Catholic Church; for, if the Hussites and the Bohemian Brethren were the most glorious period of national history, the Battle of the White Mountain in 1621 and the Counter-Reformation would not be regarded with sympathy.

These two movements greatly increased the dissatisfaction felt by the Bohemian people for the Roman Catholic Church. They became conscious once more of the presence of a foreign hierarchy, dominated as it was by Austrian feudalism, and the expression of this dissatisfaction became the duty of every patriotic Bohemian citizen. However, the majority of the Bohemian people did not want the Catholic Church to be abolished from their midst. What they demanded, was its purification and reformation. The Bohemian Catholic priest still remained in touch with his people, though all the time, in the last years of the nineteenth century, there was a gradual ripening of the anti-Catholic feeling in the sub-conscious minds of the masses. This could not be without its effect on the clergy themselves.

How seriously the priests themselves had begun to absorb anti-papal ideas in these years is shown by an incident which took place in 1902. A priest wrote a bitterly critical article on the existing situation in the Church under a pseudonym in the magazine *Bíly prapor* (The White Banner). He pointed out that the existing practice whereby everything was dependent upon the Church hierarchy and the Pope had developed during the Counter-reformation, and the Czech people had not acquiesced in it, even in the present day. The hierarchy was mistrusted, and if the Church really wished to regain the confidence of the people, it must make room for popular requirements. For instance, the divine service should be in the Czech language. The writer went on to quote statements by religious zealots in Bohemia during the time of John Huss, emphasizing that it was better to obey the word of God rather than the Church. The Church, too, was interfering in education and social questions where it had no right. This was a strong statement of opinion, but it represented views which were becoming widespread among the lower clergy. Further examples of unrest were given by the Catholic Congresses which took place in Prague in 1897, at Velehrad in 1899 and at Brno in 1903. Apart from a general welcome for modernist ideas, these Congresses now added demands which had a special Bohemian ring, reminiscent of what had been demanded in 1848. They urged the creation of a Bohemian-Slavonic Church Province under the rule of a patriarch of the Cyrilo-Methodius rite, of an all-Slavonic Academy, and the use of the Slavonic language in divine service. Thus, the Gospel could be 'preached anew in the old Church of Christ'. These demonstrations of the strength of modernist opinion began to alarm the higher clergy, particularly Bishop Brynych and Archbishop Kohn, and from now on it became increasingly difficult to publish modernist opinion openly. In February 1902 the magazine *Rozvoj* (Progress) was prohibited by all the Bohemian bishops.

At the same time, the modernist movement was being challenged by elements who were openly anti-Christian. The clash of ideas can be illustrated by the debate which took place between the modernist, E. Dlouhy-Pokorny, and the future President of the Czech Republic, T. G. Masaryk (1850—1937). Masaryk was a philosopher who devoted much of his time to the study of religious questions, and in spite of the idealism of his approach, had come to the conclusion that it would be quite impossible to reach any compromise with the Roman Catholic Church so far as reform was concerned. On the other hand, Dlouhy-Pokorny, despite his zeal for reform, remained a Christian visionary, and urged the necessity of staying within the Church and realizing reform through its clergy. It was thanks to his efforts that a Union of Catholic Priests came into being at the end of the year 1902 with the aim of promoting reform within the Church.

In the first decade of the nineteenth century, therefore, it can be seen that modernism had taken a firm root in Bohemia and Moravia among the lower clergy, despite the opposition of the Austrian hierarchy. The hands of the latter were much strengthened by the papal decision to ban the modernist movement. By the decree 'Lamentabili' and the famous encyclical of September 8th, 1907, 'Pascendi', modernism was condemned. Soon after, the Union of the Catholic Priests was dissolved and the leading representatives of Catholic Modernism, such as Dr. Loskot, Dr. Svojsik and Dr. Dlouhy-Pokorny, were expelled from the Church. For a moment it looked as though modernism had been crushed, but a new influence, this time political, prevented the complete overthrow of the movement.

At the beginning of 1907 sweeping electoral reforms were announced from Vienna, by which equal voting rights were introduced in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This led to an immediate curtailment of the influence of the nobility and, indirectly, the influence of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. It was now possible to publish more freely, and in the years before the outbreak of the First World War Loskot and others wrote a number of pamphlets popularizing John Huss, which had a wide circulation and influence. The outbreak of the war checked these activities, and the modernist clergy in Bohemia were for some time divided in their attitude towards the Austrian participation in the war.

The celebrations in 1915, which marked the 500th anniversary of Huss' martyrdom, passed off quietly. Hapsburg patriotism was an important factor in these years, and it was not until August 1917 that the voice of protest against the Church made itself heard again. Then a priest brought latent dissatisfaction into the open in an article in one of the Prague dailies. Why was there dissatisfaction? he asked. His reply was, that it took the Papal Curia almost a year before they dared make definite utterances concerning the war, and in these utterances, instead of reproving those responsible, they spoke about 'Governments devoted to our faith who had not wanted the war and cannot therefore be blamed for it'. This article had a strong effect on its readers and re-opened the rifts which separated the hierarchy from the mass of the priests and people. By the end of the year modernists among the Czech clergy realized that a revival of the revolutionary spirit of 1848 had become inevitable.

Leaders quickly emerged. They included Drs. K. Farsky and J. S. Baar, long-standing modernists, and new recruits such as X. Dvorák and M. Pavlík. In August 1918 M. Pavlík and A. Spisar founded the first modernist Catholic journal in Moravia, *Právo národa* (The Right of the Nation), published at Kromeríz, where both priests were active. Pavlík was chaplain and spiritual administrator in the Institute for the Mentally Ill, and he later became a bishop in the Czechoslovak Church. Finally, however, he went over to the Orthodox Church when it was refounded

in Czechoslovakia in 1924. Spisar was a master at the High School at Kromeríz; he had made his name as a theologian, and later became one of the outstanding theologians in the Czechoslovak Church. Under their editorship *Právo národa* welcomed the proclamation of Czech independence of October 28th, 1918, both as a day of national liberation and as a day of religious freedom, and when the Czech bishops published an encyclical expressing their regret at the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the rift between the two sides became irreparable. It was two years, however, before formal schism took place, years marked by increasing activities by the modernist and reform wing of the Church.

November 1918 saw the re-founding of the disbanded *Jednota duchovenstva* (Union of the Clergy), and this spread rapidly, recruiting more than 4,000 adherents. In January 1919 the Union held a conference under the chairmanship of J. S. Baar, and it decided to send a delegation to present its case to Pope Benedict XV himself. The memorial which was drawn up contained the following points:

(1) The establishment of a separate Slovak patriarchate.
(2) The establishment of a liturgy in the Czech language.
(3) Celibacy for the clergy should be voluntary.
(4) Theological studies and religious education should be revised in keeping with modern discoveries.
(5) There should be an inquiry into the existing system of appointment of priests to parishes.
(6) The possibilities of lay co-operation in Church administration should be explored.

The Curia did not refuse to consider these suggestions, but accepted them for further examination. This was characteristic of Vatican policy at this time. It feigned neutrality in order to gain time. Thus on August 7th, 1919, one of the leaders of the Union of Clergy, Dean F. Kroiher, reported hopefully about the visit of the Union's representatives to Rome. However, in the second half of 1919 the Curia decided against the delegation and instructed the Bohemian bishops to take action against the delegates. Bishop Gross of Litomerice received a personal letter from the Pope in which the latter assured him of his support when 'we learnt about the bravery of both you and your priests against the blindness and stubbornness of your opponents who were fighting against the principles of the Catholic faith and morality as well as against the obedience due to the Church authorities'. Gross acted with vigour and was able to split the Union of the Clergy by having Baar removed from the leadership and replacing him with Dean Kroiher, who was less radical and more loyal to Rome.

In the same month the new Archbishop of Prague, F. Kordac, was appointed by the direct decision of Rome and not by election as requested

by the Union's delegates. All chance of a Slavonic patriarch had come to an end. Kordac now instructed that as from October 1st, 1919, anyone who read *Právo národa* should be liable to excommunication. The reformers decided to pass from words to deeds. By the end of 1919 a Bohemian Mass Book had been published, divine service was being celebrated in Czech, and priests had begun to marry. A new generation of clergy more radical than the old modernists had begun to take over the leadership. Of these the most important was K. Farsky (1880—1927), the son of a farmer, who had worked his way through secondary schools to the theological faculty in Prague and had taken holy orders in 1904. As early as 1909 he had been in conflict with the Archbishop of Prague and had been relegated to Pilsen. He began to consider seriously how Church dogmatics could be reconciled with science and how modern man could attain a solid basis for his religious opinions. At the end of 1919 he emerges as a leader of the radical wing of the Czech modernists and was elected first patriarch of the Czechoslovak Church in 1924. The papal legate in Prague, Micara, now forbade the Czech Mass to be celebrated, and Benedict XV finally refused even to consider the voluntary celibacy of the clergy. Thereupon on January 8th, 1920, the radicals convened a meeting in Prague and agreed on a declaration that they had decided to segregate from the Roman Catholic Church 'in the interest of a more perfect religious life of the Bohemian nation' and to found a better and more Christian Church. The declaration, signed by four priests, Farsky, Zahradnik-Brodsky, Proacházka and Stibor, announced the decision to the Czech public on January 20th, 1920. Within a few months 200,000 people had joined the new Church. However, as in the crisis of 1848, many modernist sympathizers among the clergy hesitated when it came to making a complete break with their past. In the end, of the original 4,000 members of the Union of the Czech Clergy, only forty joined the newly-founded Church. These were, of course, formally excommunicated by the hierarchy. The hesitancy of the majority, however, served little purpose, for on January 20th, 1920, Archbishop Kordac dissolved the Union and its members were left open to disciplinary measures by their bishops. Nothing remained except a small organization that Dean Kroiher kept together until this too was brought under direct diocesan control on the orders of the Vatican.

It should be pointed out that throughout the whole of this crisis the Czechoslovak Government had adopted a reserved attitude towards the newly-founded Czechoslovak Church and was most unwilling to disturb normal relations with the Vatican at this stage. Even so, the Czechoslovak Church grew in strength until more than one million reform-minded and progressively-religious people had joined it. The rest stayed in the Roman Catholic Church, but the cause of reform in the field of religion

had become muffled and religious development within the Church checked for several decades.

The long drawn out efforts of progressively-minded clergy in Bohemia to influence the Catholic Church from within ended in failure. Looking back over nearly a century of endeavour, it seems that this was probably inevitable. Not only was the Austrian hierarchy unsympathetic to the strivings of the Czech clergy, but the policy of the Roman Curia had been moving in the opposite direction. The Ultramontanist ideal was incompatible with any sympathy for modernist aims, and while the Curia would sometimes lend its ear to the cause of conservative Catholic nationalism, it had little sympathy for a nationalism based on liberal principles. The marvel is that, given the strength of the Modernist and Hussite tradition in Bohemia, the break did not come earlier. This was due largely to the charity and loyalty of the Modernists themselves. But by 1920 not even this could avail, and final abandonment of their hopes or separation were the sole alternatives open to them.

THE GNOSTIC PROBLEM

By Dr. S. G. F. Brandon, Professor of Comparative Religion in the University of Manchester

Generations of theological students, as they begin their reading of Church History with the period usually known as 'the Church in the Roman Empire', soon find themselves enmeshed in the curious complexities of what is called 'Gnosticism'. They learn that this was a dangerous heresy with which the Christian Fathers manfully contended during the second and third century. But, as they read the brief summaries of the various Gnostic systems in their text-books, they may well wonder what all the fuss could have been about; because at first sight more perverse imaginings of the human mind could scarcely be conceived than the esoteric theories of the Gnostics about 'pleromas', 'aeons', 'syzygies', and the Demiurge. What attractions could such fantasies have possibly had for Christians who possessed the simple realistic faith set forth in the Gospels? However, some of the more sapient of theological students may have noticed, as they studied St. Paul's Epistles in the original Greek, that the great apostle often seems to be using terms and thinking in a manner strangely removed from the simple Gospel; moreover, the word *gnosis* (knowledge) sometimes appears to have a kind of specialized connotation. Perhaps, after all, Gnosticism was not a later aberration from the primitive truth of Christianity? Perhaps its roots lay further back, and perhaps it was more essentially implicated with the beginnings of Christian theology?

Such questions had long been debated by scholars specializing in the

study of problems constituted by the curious mixture of Graeco-Oriental thought which formed the mental environment of Primitive Christianity and which had moulded the minds of those who were converted to the new Christian faith. Much variety of opinion had been expressed about the origins of Gnosticism and its relation to Christianity. The champions of Christian orthodoxy had been concerned to defend the traditional attitude, which goes back to Irenaeus in the second century, namely, that the Gnostics were heretics who had erred from the truth of the Gospel. To this end it was sought to show that Gnosticism was later in appearance than Christianity; for otherwise Gnosticism could not be regarded as a perverse derivation from Christianity. This view of the nature and origin of Gnosticism was contested by certain scholars who endeavoured to prove that it antedated Christianity and stemmed from other cultural traditions. The debate suffered from the fact that, with a few exceptions, Gnosticism was known only from Christian sources, so that there was an abiding uncertainty as to whether we had sound information about it. This situation was, however, radically changed by the chance discovery in 1945 at Nag Hammadi in Upper Egypt of a number of Coptic MSS., comprising in all thirteen codices, which on examination proved to be original Gnostic documents. These codices contain the text of forty-eight works, and seem, so far as is at present known, to be Coptic translations or adaptations of Greek originals. One of the codices found its way to the Jung Institute, Zürich, and thus became available to European scholars, and is now known as the Jung Codex. The rest of the collection was acquired by the Coptic Museum at Cairo, but, owing to the political situation, their publication is now only beginning. This amazing increase in the number of original Gnostic documents available for study has been further supplemented by the publication in 1955 of some Gnostic writings contained in a papyrus which had long been housed in Berlin.

The digestion of this great mass of new material is likely to be a lengthy process, and for some time the comparatively small band of experts in Coptic studies will be suffering from an *embarras de richesse*. It would seem most probable that during the next decade or so interest in Gnosticism and its significance for the early evolution of Christian theology will steadily grow as these newly discovered writings are translated and edited for general study. The appearance of Dr. McL. Wilson's book on the Gnostic problem[1] is, therefore, most opportune. Earlier English studies of the subect are now becoming somewhat outdated, and the excellent little collection of essays relating to the Jung Codex, which Professor F. L. Cross edited in 1955,[2] served to emphasize the need of an

[1] *The Gnostic Problem*. (Mowbray, London, 1958. Pp. xii + 274. Price 35/-.)

[2] *The Jung Codex* (Mowbray). Cf. W. C. Till, 'New Sayings of Jesus in the recently discovered Coptic "Gospel of Thomas",' *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, Manchester, Vol. 41 (1959).

up-to-date survey in English of the situation. This Dr. Wilson has provided. In his book he deals fairly with all the pertinent issues concerned, with ample reference to the sources and to recent research concerning them and the questions which they raise; he includes also an account of the recently published *Apocryphon Johannis* and of the Nag Hammadi document which has been identified with the Gnostic *Gospel of Truth*, mentioned by Irenaeus. Dr. Wilson's book is necessarily an interim statement, and it will undoubtedly need revision and extension when more of the Nag Hammadi writings become available. It is nonetheless a most valuable piece of work, for which students of Early Christianity will be grateful.

In general comment it may be said that Dr. Wilson's position in regard to the basic issue of the origins of Gnosticism is conservative. The following passage seems to be a fair summary of his estimate: 'Gnosticism arises largely from an imperfect grasp of Christian principles by people brought up in the environment of the Hellenistic world, with its cosmopolitanism and its throng of competing cults; the Christian heresy is indeed only a part of a wider movement of which the origins are still obscure, although it would appear to be roughly contemporaneous with the rise of Christianity' (p. 84). But the passage is also significant of the element of self-contradiction which shows itself whenever Dr. Wilson discusses this issue. On the one hand, he appears convinced that there would have been no such thing as Gnosticism, if there had been no Christianity—hence Gnosticism was essentially a Christian heresy. Conversely, he is impressed by the evidence of the existence of what he calls 'a pre-Christian Gnosticism'. The following admission is typical of many others: 'It may be that "Gnosticism" in the full sense is even older [than the middle of the first century], but so far as can be seen at present it is more or less contemporary with Christianity' (p. 68). It seems likely that this apparent contradiction would be quickly resolved, if a more carefully defined series of terms were invented to describe the many and varied systems which are commonly denoted 'Gnostic'. However that may be, to the mind of the present writer, Dr. Wilson does not seem properly to have faced a number of facts which bear very closely on the issue whether types of Gnostic thought antedated Christianity and seriously influenced the initial development of its theology. For example, whence came Paul's idea of a pre-existent divine being, destined by God to enter into this present aeon and break the power of its daemonic rulers (*archontes*) over mankind by deceiving them through the assumption of an incarnated form (I *Cor.* ii, 6-8)? Or did Paul himself invent the esoteric concept of the *pleroma* when he wrote to the Christians at Colassae (*Cor.* i, 19; ii, 9), evidently expecting his readers to understand what the new term meant without explanation? Again, what lies behind the story of Simon Magus in *Acts* vii, 9sq.? This Simon, whom the

Christian Fathers regarded as the earliest Gnostic, was thus clearly associated in Christian tradition with the beginnings of Christianity, being already presumably a distinguished Gnostic teacher. It is also significant that Dr. Wilson never really closes with the very pertinent problem constituted by the *Corpus Hermeticum*. This collection of writings, which he himself admits is quite independent[3] of Christianity, dates in its extant form for the period 100—300 A.D., and is concerned with the salvation of the immortal part of man through a divine *gnosis*. The *Corpus Hermeticum* clearly derives from even older traditions of mystical philosophy.[4] And one last remark. Dr Wilson writes: 'The Gnostic redeemer is not pre-Christian, but simply a more radical interpretation of the Christian Jesus in terms of current belief' (p. 225). Any statement about the evolution of soteriology in the ancient Near East which ignores the figure of Osiris, neglects to consider the significance of the oldest and most remarkable saviour-god of antiquity. A proper appreciation of this deity has indeed still to be written; but, when one considers that the Egyptian resurrected god, through ritual identification with whom the dead pharaohs of the third millenium B.C. hoped for new life, was still held to be a potent saviour of men more than two thousand years later as the writings of Apuleius and Plutarch attest, it is obvious that the influence of his example cannot be ignored.

With the newly-discovered Gnostic writings, together with the Dead Sea Scrolls, students of the Christian Origins have an abundance of material which will surely take more than a generation properly to absorb and evaluate. What that evaluation may finally be is at present a matter for prophecy only; but the temptation to forecast either in the interests of orthodoxy or for sensational effect should be honestly eschewed by all concerned. Careful investigation is needed, and Dr. Wilson has given such good proof of his ability for this that we hope that 'We will hear thee again of this matter'.[5]

[3]Thus the latest editor of the *Corpus*, A. D. Nock (*Corpus Hermeticum*, with A. J. Festugière, t.i., Paris, 1945, p.v.).

[4]To the present writer it is particularly remarkable that Dr. Wilson does not discuss what Fr. Festugière writes about the origins of Gnostic cosmogony and anthropology in his great work, *La Révélation d'Hermes Trismégiste* (Paris, 1953), t.iii, pp. ix–26.

[5]This review article was written before the publication of the text and translation of *The Gospel according to Thomas* (Brill and Collins, Nov. 1959) and *The Secret Sayings of Jesus*, by F. C. Grant and D. N. Freeman (Collins, Feb. 1960). The present writer hopes to read a paper on the significance of the text in relation to Gnosticism and early Christianity at the Modern Churchmen's Conference in August, 1960.

REVIEWS

ETHICS AND ONTOLOGY

This is a curious book,[1] which at least one reader has gone through carefully twice without being able to grasp quite what the author is trying to say or indeed to achieve. The one thing that can be said with certainty is that it is a study in the different ways that ethical language can be used, written somewhat in the style of a 'novel of atmosphere', bringing out various subtle differences of *nuance* and highlighting the tensions that occur in different situations. Professor Mackinnon studies a number of writers on ethics more or less at random: H. A. Pritchard, Mill and the Utilitarians, Kant, Isaiah Berlin, Bishop Butler, Hegel and St. Paul each serve to illustrate one aspect of his subject, one mood, as it were, in which ethical language may be used. If he makes no reference whatever to the ethical teaching of Jesus, Buddha or Plato, or even of Aristotle or Confucius, it is hard to know whether he can be criticised for omitting them or not: it is scarcely posible to criticise a playwright's use of character when you are not clear just what plot he has in mind.

Undeniably, the book brings out interesting points. Equally certainly, its style is self-conscious to the point of irritation: the author is continually apologising for apparently going on too long in a digression, or for making unusual statements, or for not being clear. Some random quotations will illustrate this: 'To speak of so rigorous and exact a thinker as a crusader may raise a smile'; 'All this may seem itself unnecessarily laboured'; 'It may well seem to the reader that this introductory section has gone on too long'—such expressions abound throughout the book. So do others in which the author tells us what he is going to do, or has just done: 'It will be clear that in this section of the argument there has been a most decided shifting of the ground'; 'Of course in what I have said so far there has been a repeated suggestion of the defensive'; 'Thus the first section of this chapter will inevitably have something of the character of a recapitulation'—such expressions sometimes help the reader to follow an argument, but here they are used altogether beyond reason. Finally, Professor Mackinnon shows an almost sickeningly sycophantic wish to apologise to the philosophers of the logical analytical schools for daring to use certain traditional types of language about God and Freedom. Of course, these philosophers need to be taken seriously: they cannot just be ignored with a fine disregard for their strictures on the use of language, as some religious writers seem to think. But if Professor Mackinnon wants to use language which they would regard as taboo, let him come out into the open and say so; let him present the case that makes him believe the words can still be held to have a meaning, and then get on with using them without continual glances over his shoulder. The tentative, cautious style he has adopted—hinting for example that even though what he has just said may be nonsense, at least it serves to indicate a peculiar tension in the minds of philosophers—resembles the prose style of Henry James, and makes the present reviewer understand what led H. G. Wells to ask, in his famous parody, 'Ought there to *be* Henry James?'

The odd thing is that on one point of very great importance Professor Mackinnon *does* ignore the current philosophical Establishment altogether: he discusses the question of the possibility of deriving judgements of value from judgements of fact, as if it were still allowed to be an open question. In fact, as far as I have been able to discover, almost all modern philosophers of the linguistic schools would take it for granted that it is now closed. Although I have not seen the point put in precisely this way, the general assumption is, I think, that Kant's critique closed it and G. E. Moore turned the key in the lock and threw it away for good. Professor Mackinnon treats

[1] *A Study in Ethical Theory*, by D. M. Mackinnon (Adam and Charles Black, 21s. 280 pp.).

Kant's argument at great length, in a discussion which, for me at least, brought home the great philosopher's purpose more vividly than any work I have read for many years, yet because the book's procedure is so ecclectic and Kant's case is treated as just one among many, the reader gains no impression of Kant's having *established* his case that moral and factual judgements are logically independent. When Professor Mackinnon quotes H. A. Pritchard's even more trenchant assertion of the same point, he makes no attempt to link him with Kant, and again conveys the impression that the view is only one among many in the contemporary scene. No reference is made to Moore's classical analysis at all, nor to any modern study such as R. M. Hare's *The Language of Morals,* while all the thinkers who are quoted as believing that 'ought' judgements *can* be derived from 'is' judgements are *earlier* than the modern linguistic fashion in philosophy. The result is that Professor Mackinnon's whole discussion of this vitally important issue has an air of unreality: it is as if a discussion were to be conducted on the subject of religious philosophy without reference to the all-pervading influence in the contemporary scene of the strictures of Professor Ayer. I find this regrettable, precisely because I believe that this question of the relation between ethics and ontology does need to be re-opened. I believe that the logical separation which modern philosophy makes between 'ought' and 'is' constitutes one of the two most important challenges that theological thinkers have to face to-day,[2] and Professor Mackinnon's book in fact has a good deal of value to say in this respect.

There are, of course, a number of religious philosophers in our own day who have made an accommodation with the separation—notably, in this country, Professor H. D. Lewis, whose writings are well known to readers of the *Modern Churchman.* These philosophers argue that the will of God for man is good because God wills what *is* good, not just because it is God's will. This is the Kantian position as Professor Mackinnon describes it. 'At first sight', he writes, 'it is easy to suppose that Kant's austere morality is the necessary ally of a religious view of the world; nothing could be further from the truth . . . a moral enormity is not redeemed by being presented as the commandment of a god; rather it is that god who is discredited'. Perhaps; but surely the religious man cannot rest in the belief that God is good only by a sort of happy accident? Is there not in some sense an essential connotation of goodness in the very word 'God'? Do not all the most mature religions of the world proclaim that God is, not accidentally but essentially, the *summum bonum*?

I do not see how any doctrine of God which makes His goodness a mere attribute can stand for a moment against the problem of evil; it is useless to try to answer this by an appeal to freedom, as Professor Flew has shown. The only hope of withstanding his ingenious reversal of the Moral Argument is to deny the basic premises of his ethical thinking, and it seems to me that the New Testament, and for that matter many of the other great 'religious classics' of the world, present us with just such a revolution in the *mode,* as well as in the content, of ethical thought. The radical *metanoia,* or change of world-outlook, which is characteristic of religion, seems to me to be both axiological *and ontological*—at one and the same time. The ordinary idea of moral judgement is asserted to be somehow profoundly mistaken: the great Eastern religions speak of the goal of life as 'beyond good and evil', the Jewish tradition makes the acquisition of knowledge of good and evil the occasion for man's alienation from God, and Jesus commands 'Judge not'. At the same time love is held to exercise moral obligation upon human beings, and love is seen not as a 'value' but as *an existent reality*: 'God *is* love', and 'he that abideth in love abideth in God, and God in him'.

[2]The other, in my opinion, being the problem of the relationship between belief in God and the notion of chance.

Professor Mackinnon does deal with this issue, in his concluding chapter on 'Ethics, Metaphysics and Religion', but his argument is (to me at any rate) obscure—partly, I suspect, because he represents the religious viewpoint in terms of St. Paul's concept of 'apostleship', interpreted in Kierkegaardian terms. I should have been more interested in an examination of the ethical implications of St. John's teaching —or, if St. Paul is chosen (and he is undoubtedly much more the conventional ethical philosopher—but perhaps that is why I think his religious insight is the less!), it would have been instructive to examine the doctrine of justification. For I believe, in contradistinction from my more august namesake of King's College, London, that it is just here that there ought to be 'fruitful strife' between religious and non-religious ethical philosophers. I believe the greatest contribution which religious philosophers have to make to the general advance of philosophy may well come from the new light they will be able to throw upon problems of ethics and problems of ontology alike if they can once sort out for themselves the logical expression of the revolutionary doctrine of 'moral being' upon which all the great religious systems are based.

I do not pretend to have begun to sort this out myself, although I think the clue to doing so lies in a more radical criticism of our ordinary assumptions about what a 'judgement of existence' means. Is this in fact as simple a matter as we are apt to suppose? When we say that the judgement that something exists is totally unconnected with any moral valuation, are we not assuming that abstract theoretical standpoint which Kant showed to be untenable? If we take seriously his establishment of the 'primacy of practical reason', it is surely necessary to admit that when we judge a thing or a person to exist we are acknowledging a *concern*, a *claim* upon us for some sort of response. Even the judgements of science, which are usually assumed to be quite uncontaminated by any questions of value, are not really so if, as I have argued before in the *Modern Churchman*, the very logical structure of scientific reasoning presupposes an operational or utilitarian attitude: a scientific existential judgement is actually a judgement about *value for use*. In the light of this clue I think Professor Mackinnon's account of Kant's ethical doctrine may be very illuminating for the problem I have been discussing. The moral law which makes its claim upon us simply because we are rational beings may perhaps be seen to be directly connected with the fact that we exercise our rational being as persons in a world of relations with other persons, since the very acknowledgement of a person's existence is the acknowledgement of a being who is an end and not a means.

This has been (if I may use the style I have just criticised Mackinnon for using!) a long digression from the study of his book: I write it because it indicates how the book has, for all my strictures, succeeded in stimulating my own thinking about the problems of ethics. Let me conclude by saying that readers with quite different interests in ethical theory are likely to find equally stimulating things in it for them. Professor Mackinnon's continual attempt to get behind the formal structure of ethical theories to discover what people are actually *doing for themselves* when they talk about moral issues in these ways is very valuable, for example. So is his comment on the pacifists of the thirties who 'so fell in love with an abstract image of purity of intention that they forgot the realities of the world in which that intention had to be realised in concrete'. Finally, the following quotation from his chapter on Kant shows the sound sense which he exhibits throughout:

> 'If he (Kant) rejects the heteronomy of the "party line", equally emphatically he will have none of that mistrust of State action in the interest of the common welfare which bases itself on a false mystique of the "personal". We are all of us familiar with the sort of pathetically dated "lady bountiful" who proclaims her

regret that the growth of publicly conceived and executed policies of social welfare has robbed of all true "human" concern the relations between those who administer and those who receive such benefits. Of course what she means is little more than that what she has delighted to call *her* "charities" no longer provide her with the necessary outlet for her consuming egotism. Even those who were not prepared to defend the slums as desirable schools for the achievement of heroic sanctity find it sometimes a little hard not to mourn the passing of the soup-kitchen in the name of what they call "truly personal relations". But for Kant the supremacy of the moral order in no way whatsoever vindicates the special dignity of the "personal" in this sense; indeed in such a situation it is the clear demand of the moral law that the "personal" yield before the relatively impersonal, the particular before the relatively universal; for thus the "lady bountiful" will be protected against the self-deception and masquerade involved in her role, and the recipients of her "charity", who now receive of public right what is their due, preserved against a real affront to their dignity.

JOHN WREN-LEWIS

BERKELEY UP TO DATE

Mr. Cleobury has written an able book[1] which shows considerable acquaintance with recent writings by philosophers on the possibility (or impossibility) of metaphysical and theological arguments. He notes that metaphysics, in the sense of 'models' or 'directives' indicating the basic categories in terms of which a person orders his thinking about the world, is on the way in, and in any case he sees no reason why a thinker, especially perhaps a Christian theologian, should not go ahead and argue for a positive metaphysical position. To which I think most contemporary philosophers would answer, 'All right, by all means do so; but be careful'. Mr. Cleobury's own metaphysics is a form of Berkleian idealism, theistic as was Berkeley's. Sentences about material objects are to be interpreted as sentences about relations between our experiences. In this respect, he says sentences like 'This ship has three masts' are of the same logical form as sentences like 'Courage is valuable'. (I cannot help thinking that a good deal more analysis is needed here.)

The bases of Mr. Cleobury's personal idealism are the convictions, first, that the subject word 'I' in sentences like 'I see a table' performs an indispensable function in indicating a unity in perception, and that this unity cannot be dissolved in Humean fashion into a collection of perceptions (this Kantian point is well taken); and secondly, that there is a direct intelligibility about sentences such as 'I am in pain' and 'William is in pain' which he does not find in sentences about material objects. He therefore concludes that personal language is prior, and sentences about impersonal objects must be construed as sentences about persons and their experiences. Here a would-be realist might think that the case is made too easily. In the first place, does a sentence such as 'William is feeling pain' correspond (as is claimed on p. 90) to a subject-quality situation 'in a simple direct way'? The subtle if tortuous efforts of a John Wisdom to interpret such sentences suggests they are not so simple. In the second place, Mr. Cleobury seems to equate 'realism' about physical objects with a crude combination of naive realism and representative perception (e.g. that a vase exists exactly corresponding to my percept of it). An acquaintance with the works of realists such as Russell, Broad and Price would surely have shown him that there are much subtler views than this about the reference of percepts to occupants of regions of space, exercising casual properties, but probably very unlike their

[1] *Christian Rationalism and Philosophical Analysis*, by F. H. Cleobury (James Clarke and Co. Ltd., 15s. 162 pp.).

appearances in our perception. These views may not do; but the point is that the implausibility of a simple direct correspondence between percepts and objects does not mean that there may not be more complicated forms of realism for which there are stronger arguments than Mr. Cleobury allows.

This leads to a general difficulty which I find in the claims Mr. Cleobury makes for his argument. He says that it is 'proof' not in the sense of logical or mathematical necessity, but in the sense in which, for instance, we can have overwhelming conviction that other people exist. But he also says that his argument is 'final and irrefutable', in that no empirical evidence can upset it. *Any* piece of empirical evidence can be interpreted in subjectivist terms as a statement about someone's experiences. Perhaps; but it would be misleading if anyone were to conclude from this that because this metaphysical position is in this sense irrefutable, it is 'proved' as the only possible position. There could be arguments (stronger, I think, than Mr. Cleobury allows) for forms of realism which could be 'irrefutable' in just the same sense. The procedures for deciding between alternative metaphysical directives are not firmly established and publicly agreed. One can produce arguments, as (in Mill's phrase) 'considerations capable of influencing the intellect', and Mr. Cleobury does so. But I cannot help thinking that he 'doth protest too much'.

University of Manchester. DOROTHY EMMET

PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY

This is an excellent book,[1] as profound and clear as one has learned to expect a book by Father d'Arcy to be. It deals with much the same problem as those which form the subject of Professor R. C. Zaehner's recent book on mysticism, namely the claim, made by certain modern writers such as Mr. Aldous Huxley, that all those experiences which we class together as 'mystical' are of essentially the same type, and witness to a 'perennial philosophy' which is the highest common factor, and the only really vital feature, of all religions. Professor Zaehner has refuted this oversimplification in one of the ways in which it must be done if it is to be done at all, namely by a detailed analysis of a large number of records of so-called mystical experiences; he dealt scathingly with the suggestion that mescalin intoxication and the beatific vision are akin. Father d'Arcy's general conclusions are similar, but his approach is more purely philosophical. He welcomes any attempt to bring West and East closer together—to find an ideal religion acceptable to all—but he does not think that the perennial philosophy envisaged by Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Aldous Huxley and others is the authentic version for which we should be looking.

The one irreconcilable difference between mystics is the difference in their estimate of the value of human individuality. The one type dislikes self-conscious rationality, and regards its extermination (or, what is precisely the same, its 'absorption' into something all-inclusive) as desirable. This, with notable exceptions, is the oriental view. But orthodox Christian mystics have interpreted their experiences in the light of a more soundly and rationally based philosophy and of the Biblical tradition. The Christian tradition is that selfconscious individual existence is *good*; the goal is not extermination but life more abundant. There is no possibility of reconciliation here. Father d'Arcy remarks (page 71) that 'Christianity is nearer the Communist ideal of a perfect society than to the ideal of nirvana or the absorption of the individual in a Divine Ground'. The Christian rejects the view that 'only the One really exists, and that the rest is either illusion or a moment in the circular or evolutionary movement of the One. This explanation tidies up the universe at whatever cost' (page 115).

[1] *The Meeting of Love and Knowledge*, by Martin d'Arcy, S.J. (George Allen & Unwin, 1958. 12s. 6d.).

'Something is lacking, and a philosophy which could keep up the high notes of this gnosis, conceive of a unity and nevertheless restore what is wanting, namely the place, however humble, of the finite and the personal, such a philosophy would contain more abundantly the perennial wisdom'. F. H. Cleobury

FOR OR AGAINST THE HEBREWS?

The study of the New Testament writers' use of the Old Testament, always an interesting subject, has received fresh stimulus of late from the study of those documents in which the Qumran community's interpretation of the Old Testament is revealed.

No New Testament writer makes fuller use of the Old Testament writings than does the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and his distinctive approach to the Old Testament has been an attractive subject for research, among English theologians particularly. Fairly recently, for example, we have had Professor Aileen Guilding's suggestion that his approach can best be appreciated if we regard the epistle as a homily for the Pentacostal season, based on the proper lessons and psalms prescribed for that period.

Canon Synge revives the Testimony Book hypothesis in his endeavour to discover the author's principle of biblical interpretation, but he develops the hypothesis along lines of his own, although he acknowledges his indebtedness to Canon Stather Hunt. He points out that modern readers may fail to see the relevance of the Old Testament quotations with which the epistle commences, and the principle on which they are brought together. Their original context is rarely messianic, but the author of the epistle plainly expects his readers to admit their christological force as readily as he himself does. Canon Synge points out that in each of them God is represented as conversing with someone else, and this someone else, for want of a better designation, he calls the 'Heavenly Companion'. Hebrews, he argues, is based upon a collection of *testimonia* relating to this 'Heavenly Companion', whom the author identifies with Christ.

The traditional title of the epistle should be translated not 'To the Hebrews' but 'Against the Hebrews'; it is a polemical work, directed against certain Jews who had attached themselves to some Jewish-Christian synagogue, but were content to stay at the catechumen stage instead of committing themselves irrevocably to Christ. Since it was written at a time when it was possible for Jews and Christians to expound their common scriptures to each other without bitterness, and to agree to a considerable extent about their interpretation, Canon Synge concludes that a rather early date is indicated, around A.D.55.

This little book will be welcomed as a stimulating contribution to the study of Hebrews, although its argument may not be accepted in full. If the argument in places appears strange and unconvincing, that may largely be due to Canon Synge's intellectual and spiritual affinity with the author of Hebrews himself!

F. F. Bruce

**Hebrews and the Scriptures*, by F. C. Synge (London. S.P.C.K., 1959. 7s. 6d. vii, 64 pp.).

A CLASSIC OF NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM[1]

H. J. Cadbury was one of the most valuable authors of *The Beginnings of Christianity* in 1922, not the least useful of his contributions being one of the Appendices to Volume II which took the form of a commentary on Luke 1.1-4, which he still regarded as the prologue to the whole work, Luke-Acts (not merely to the gospel) when he published in 1927 *The Making of Luke-Acts;* in this comprehensive study

[1] *The Making of Luke-Acts*, by Henry J. Cadbury. 2nd edition (S.P.C.K., 1958. 18s. 6d.).

he achieved a monument of painstaking and well-informed description, as distinct from argument designed to reach definite conclusions about the date and authorship of the works under discussion. The description embraced the material (Chapters III-VIII), 'the prevailing ways of thought, expression and composition with which the author complied' (Chapters IX-XV), the author's individuality (Chapters XVI-XIX), and the purpose of writing. This description was undertaken by a scholar of wide learning, very unusual insight, and marked independence. The result was a book of classic importance, indispensable to students of Luke-Acts and one of the best introductions to critical study of the New Testament in general. To many, though perhaps unhappily to a minority, the most attractive feature is contentment with description allied to a refusal to attempt conclusions for which there is neither sufficient evidence nor necessity. Cadbury is a stout witness against the prevailing demand for certainty, or failing that, dogmatic decision, where God appears to summon us rather to faith and unending search.

The S.P.C.K. have therefore rendered a service to both learning and piety by re-issuing the book, with a short *Preface to the Second Edition* by the author in which, while he refers appreciatively to the importance of more recent work in the same sphere, confesses that he has 'not felt called upon to make revisions or additions'. He was quite right. There is little to change in a book which has been used as a foundation rather than a target for criticism, and we need do no more than mention one or two points which come to mind on a re-reading. The explanation of Semitisms in Luke-Acts (pp. 72 ff.) would now be very widely accepted that they are Septuagintalisms (since Sparks in JTS, xliv), a point which Cadbury very nearly makes himself, emphasizing the great influence of the Septuagint on the author (pp. 122 f. and 221 ff.). Few would now describe Mark as artless or think that 'no distinct biographical or theological motives can be attributed to him' (p. 82). This is perhaps modified slightly on p. 90 where the importance of Mark is stressed, but 'we note its comparative simplicity and primitiveness' (p. 92), a comment acceptable in the post-Lightfoot-Farrer age only if we stress the word 'comparative'. The treatment in Chapter XIV on speeches, letters, and canticles is curiously meagre, but no doubt the danger here was to be plunged into detail such as the author was bound to avoid. Elsewhere, it is striking how often one would adopt a position more confidently than Cadbury himself: for example, if the gospel is biography and Acts history (pp. 130 ff.) but the two are really volumes one and two of the same work, may we not say that the whole is biographical history? Again, after Conzelmann (*Die Mitte der Zeit*) we can be more definite about Luke's ignorance of Palestinian geography, and would not object that none 'but the initiated' could 'realize that the mission of the Seventy symbolizes, as some modern scholars maintain, "the gospel of the uncircumcision" (the Gentiles popularly being reckoned as seventy nations), as the mission of the Twelve symbolizes the "apostleship of the circumcision" ' (p. 255). We should accept this and associate with the Seventy the Seven of Acts 6 (so Farrer in *The Apostolic Ministry*, pp. 137 ff.). But these are small complaints; only slightly more important is that in discussing Lucan eschatology Cadbury fails to emphasize the relation of the absent Christ who has ascended to his throne and therefore *reigns* to the coming Christ who shall *rule*, to prepare for which transformation is the Church's *raison d'etre*.

The general critical position, being description, can hardly be condensed for reproduction here; many were the influences upon the author, who may be Luke the companion of Paul, though the evidence for this is neither strong nor cumulative: the tradition may have begun with an unjustified conclusion from the New Testament hints. He did not use Josephus or Paul (p. 327). On the more advanced theories

of to-day (e.g. Luke a second Deuteronomy)[2] we cannot quote an opinion of Cadbury. It would be interesting to know what he thinks, but we have at any rate this collection of indispensable knowledge, and we cannot be too grateful.

ROBERT LEANEY

[2]Evans in *Studies in the Gospels.*

PREACHING—PRECEPT AND PRACTICE

Many readers of *The Modern Churchman* will feel out of sympathy with the conservative evangelical view point of Dr. R. A. Ward, whose book *Royal Sacrament, The Preacher and His Message*[1] adds yet another to the endless number of books on the art of preaching. Apart from the anti-liberal note which reverberates throughout, Dr. Ward shows little awareness of the social setting of the Christian life; nor is there any treatment of the problem of communication. It is not enough in these days to say we must preach Christ and our preaching must be theological unless these great maxims are raised above the level of oft reiterated pious platitudes.

Although Dr. Ward's book disappoints on this level, there is much in it for which to be grateful. One great merit of the book is that it shows the preacher must be a student. The book reveals the author's own acquaintance with a wide range of New Testament Scholarship.

Many preachers will find starting points for their own preaching as they read this book. The Chapter on 'The Preacher and his Greek Testament' is full of suggestive and fertile themes. The following chapters on 'The Preacher and his General Literature', and 'The Preacher and his Daily Life', are less successful.

There can be no doubt that Dr. Ward likes preaching and however much we may feel out of tune with his general approach, we cannot but be grateful to him for communicating afresh the joyful privilege and the grave responsibility that belongs to those who are ministers of the Royal Sacrament of Preaching.

Turning from precept to practice, we are glad to commend unreservedly Dr. Vidler's *Windsor Sermons.* They are lucid, written in a simple and forceful style with a learning that is carried lightly and presented attractively. Whether he is speaking of some book of the Bible, some aspect of prayer, some doctrine, word or miscellaneous theme, Dr. Vidler has the happy knack of speaking forcefully and vividly. His book of Windsor Sermons is a joy to read. Preachers young and old will find guidance here. We venture the not very difficult prophecy that these sermons will go a long way.

W. G. FALLOWS

[1]Marshall Morgan & Scott, 1958. 12s. 6d.; and *Windsor Sermons,* by Dr. A. R. Vidler, (S.C.M. Press, 1958. 15s.).

EAST AND WEST

The task of translating and interpreting the philosophical and religious literature of Hinduism for the benefit of Western students has in recent years been taken up with enthusiasm by scholars who, being native to India and cradled in Hinduism, have brought to their work an experience and insight difficult if not impossible of attainment to the scholar brought up in the orthodox Christian tradition. These Indian scholars, themselves quickened by the critical and scientific spirit of the West, are convinced that Hinduism has something of value to offer to the West, and that in the Upanishads, perhaps more than anywhere else in the vast literature of India, the ancient spiritual lore of India is embodied.

Of these Hindu interpreters Swami Nikhilananda is one of the best known in the Western world. Educated at Calcutta University, he was ordained a monk of the Ramakrishna Order. He was sent to America in 1931, and became the founder of the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Centre in New York.

In this fourth volume[1] Swami Nikhilananda completes his work on the eleven principal Upanishads by translating from the Sanskrit the important Taittiriya and Chhandogya Upanishads. The former is regarded as an important source of Vedanta philosophy, and is largely taken up with meditations on Brahman. The Chhandogya Upanishad, regarded as one of the earliest and most authoritative of the Upanishads, discusses the fundamental doctrines of the Vedanta, always with the end in view that the student might be led to realise his True Self and come to the knowledge of the Atman.

As in previous volumes the author bases his own commentary on that of Ṣankara. In a short introduction by the author the general theme of each Upanishad is expounded, and this is followed by a translation of Ṣankara's introduction. Each section of the text is then translated, followed by explanatory notes. These explanatory notes are of great value, and indeed are an essential aid to the English reader if he is to understand and appreciate the recondite and often extremely difficult teaching of the text. A useful glossary of Sanskrit is also appended.

Surely no one can read this work through without a deepening appreciation both for the original authors of the Upanishads, who wrestled with and sought satisfactory answers to the problems of human life and destiny, and for the modern Hindu interpreter, Swami Nikhilananda, to whom this must have been a work both of piety and love.

D. Howard Smith

[1]Swami Nikhilananda, *The Upanishads. Vol. iv.* (Phoenix House, London, 1959. 25s. pp. l-xvii+406).

CHURCH AND KIRK

This book[1] is a fresh examination of Scottish Church history and doctrine, and their basis in the Reformed tradition, at a time when Anglican and Presbyterian relations are a matter of common and even uncommon talk, but not always with the requisite background-knowledge sympathetically ranged for the fray.

The first part of the book, rather less than half, is historical. There is a good chapter on Calvin, in which the author brings out the Reformer's strong doctrine of the Church as Corpus Christi. Calvin's 'principal concern is to arrive at an ordering of the Church that shall preclude the usurping of Christ's place. He thinks this is usurped not only by a pope who, under pretext of vice-regency, presumes to exercise *dominion* over the Body of Christ, but no less by a mob that by ignorant and thoughtless procedures arbitrarily introduces confusion into the Body which Christ alone has the right to reign'. We are also acquainted with Calvin's high doctrine of the Eucharist, which was not merely 'individual and internal, not corporate', as Dom Gregory Dix maintained.

A great deal of the rest of the book must be passed over without reference here. There is a chapter, entitled 'Ecclesia Scoticana', the essential feature of which is that the Separatist notion of the Scottish Church is alien to the Reformed tradition. This is brought out again in the chapter on the Eucharist. Dr. MacGregor shows that 'though other foreign influences affected the Scots, it was to Geneva at this time that they principally looked for guidance. But they did so not as importing a foreign theology for building a new Church. They saw themselves as, rather, borrowing theological ideas for the work of restoring their own Church to health'.

The doctrinal half of the book cannot adequately be summarised in a short space. In the chapter on 'The Eucharist in the Reformed Church', the centrality of the Eucharist in the worship of the Reformed Church is emphasised. 'The insistence

[1]*Corpus Christi: The Nature of the Church according to the Reformed Tradition*, by Geddes MacGregor (MacMillan. 30s. 302 pp.).

upon the association of Word and Sacrament is calculated to exalt the latter no less than the former.'

Finally, we refer to the chapter which deals with 'The Episcopate in the Reformed Tradition'. The main contention is that in the Reformed tradition, the Bishop cannot be the guarantor of unity nor ground of continuity. The doctrine of apostolic succession through the episcopal office contradicts the Reformed doctrine of the Church, which accepts Christ alone as the guarantor of unity and ground of continuity. Defenders of the doctrine of apostolic succession through the 'historic episcopate', believing that Christ willed His authority to be transmitted to and continued in the succession of bishops, make the Church dependent for its existence upon an 'organ' other than Christ. The presence of this 'organ' guarantees its life, and the 'death' of the organ would effect the death of the Church. But the Reformed tradition disbelieves that 'the Spirit might ever be "conserved" in an "organ" with the Body, or that it can be given to any man, or even to the ministry as a whole, to be the curator of the Spirit, or even of the Body. . . . In the Body of Christ there is no such dependence, except upon the Head. The ministry is therefore not so indispensable that the Church could not conceivably survive without it for a time, or that a complete break in the ministry would be fatal to the continuity of the Church and therefore to its life. . . . The episcopate may in some places be failing in its duty, if it does not provide for patriarchs and archbishops; elsewhere the work of the episcopate may be performed better without bishops.'

There is a comprehensive bibliography to help the student, from which the few omissions of note are obvious.

R. J. W. Bevan

KNOW THYSELF

The seventeen chapters in this book[1] by contributors, not all confined to residence in this country, are introduced by a clear and explanatory editorial introduction.

The kind of self-criticism they offer us is realistic. Some of the issues, which the Lambeth Report tends to cloak in high-sounding and nebulous phrases, are brought down to earth. For example, in a chapter on 'The Importance of Technical Competence', Mr. Denys Munby writes, 'Few Anglican writers know anything about economics. . . . This has not prevented the Christendom group and other Anglican writers writing about economics . . . and creating in the minds of those less knowledgeable than themselves the impression that they knew what they were talking about'. Again, 'It is unhappily the case that few Christian theologians or church leaders have had any training in the social sciences'.

There are two challenging essays on 'The Missionary Culture' and 'Missionary Malaise and Missionary Vocation'. In the first it is pointed out that, 'What, in fact, we have done is to introduce to Africa not 'the pure milk of the Gospel', but a 'missionary culture', in which the Gospel is inextricably interwoven with the techniques and values of a civilisation which it has itself helped to create'. In the second we read that, 'By our very success we came unconsciously to believe that the Gospel "belonged" to us westerners, something we were prepared and happy to share with the rest of mankind, in exactly the same way as we were sharing western education and the techniques of the industrial revolution'.

Special mention must be made of an exceptional essay 'Integrity in Apologetics, or the Dangers of Resorting to Bluff in Theology' by John Wren-Lewis, a member of the Council of the Modern Churchmen's Union. He considers that, 'Christian intellectual circles are amongst the most snobbish in the country. . . . To profess a

[1] *Essays in Anglican Self-Criticism*. Edited by David M. Paton (S.C.M. Press. 25s. 238 pp.).

regard for the *last* fashionable thinker is to invite ridicule. . . . There is a regrettable theological lifemanship in apologetics in which the technique is to mention "the O.K. name". . . . The general effect of the work of the more theological critics is *to make it more clear than ever that the orthodox interpretation of the biblical documents depends upon a prior acceptance of at least the probability of the orthodox position'*. This last remark is a justifiably strong comment on the modern vogue of Biblical theology, which many of us feel has strayed far into the realm of artificiality, in spite of the mutual 'back-slapping' which goes on between some of its chief exponents.

The main impression one gets, after reading this book, is that it tries to remove some of the wool, which for a long time has been firmly pulled over our eyes, about the position of the Anglican Church in the life of the nation and the modern world, and its competence to deal with its own and others' problems. We have here not only essays in Anglican Self-Criticism, but exercises in Anglican Self-Perspective.

R. J. W. Bevan

WHITEHEAD FOR BEGINNERS

This is an important book,[1] if for no other reason than its witness to the fact that the analysts have by no means killed constructive or metaphysical philosophy. Whitehead was a really great philosopher; he understood perfectly well what the positivists were saying; he did not agree, and he went on with his metaphysics. But there are other reasons for calling this an important book. For one thing, Whitehead's works are difficult, and Dr. Leclerc has done us good service by explaining Whitehead's basic conceptions in clear language and exhibiting their logical connection.

It is not easy to affix any of the usual labels to the philosophy expounded in this book. Whitehead is usually regarded as a 'realist' but his 'reformed subjectivist principle', although incompatible with *subjective* idealism and 'representative perception', is no more so than is the objective idealism of Edward Caird or Seth Pringle-Pattison, and there is little in the exposition of this principle to which a neo-Kantian idealist need object, and much which he welcomes. For example, on page 125 Dr. Leclerc tells us that 'since experiencing involves the "inclusion" of other actualities, those actualities, in order to be capable of being "included" or "immanent" in the experiencing actuality, cannot themselves be of a metaphysical nature utterly different from that of the experiencing actuality'. The objects of our experience 'cannot be essentially "non-experiencing entities" '. It is true that the word 'experience' is given an interpretation wider than that of some idealist writers; Whitehead replaces Leibniz's contrast of 'perception' and 'apperception' by the contrast of 'prehension' and 'apprehension'; but idealists such as F. H. Bradley and A. E. Taylor had taken the essential point long ago.

Again, Whitehead insisted that many of our nouns do not stand for fully existent or actual entities but for what are merely ingredients in, or derivative from, actual entities, and he directed this argument against the popular belief that so-called 'material objects' are actual entities and have simple location. In this he is stating sound idealist doctrine; I was warned forty years ago against the fallacy of giving substance to abstractions.

Whitehead's pluralism, again, is by no means absolute. Admittedly there is a criticism of monism on pages 55 and 56, and it is essentially that which William James offered in *A Pluralist Universe,* namely that monism still leaves us with Reality on the one hand and the 'modes' or 'appearances' or even the 'illusions' on the other, and is thus not really monism at all. There is an answer to this, for the monist would deny that the modes are actual existing entities in Whitehead's sense, but my immediate point is that Whitehead's complaint against a so-called monism which leaves you with a plurality is that such a plurality is *incoherent*. But if coherence is your test

of Reality, then you must believe Reality to be absolutely coherent—i.e. in some sense a system, and the essence of a system is that it is a unity. Whitehead, of course, as Dr. Laclerc's exposition shows, insisted that the unity must be a concrete unity of differences; but so did Hegel for that matter.

I hope this book will be widely read—although 'read' is hardly the correct word; it needs *study*. In Whitehead we have a really first-class thinker, well acquainted with modern philosophy and science, who deliberately tried not to be influenced by ethical and religious motives when engaged on pure metaphysics, but who believed in God because he thought the argument led that way. A belief so reached will not, in itself, be religiously sufficient, as Whitehead would have agreed, but such a basis for belief in God is vitally necessary. If there is no *reason* to believe in God, there is no reason to interpret *any* human experience as experience *of God*.

F. H. Cleobury

[1] *Whitehead's Metaphysics. An Introductory Exposition*, by Ivor Leclerc (George Allen & Unwin, 1958. 21s.).

SHORT NOTICES

Jesus in His Own Times, by Sherman E. Johnson (Adam & Black, London, 1958. 12s. 6d. pp. x + 180).

This small book is evidence, if such were needed, that, despite the prevailing theological fashion, interest remains firm in the so-called 'historical Jesus'. Dr. Johnson describes his book as ' study of Jesus in the light of his geographical, cultural and religious background', and the influence of the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls is very apparent in it. The book may generally be commended as a fresh, well-informed account of Jesus in relation to his environment by a scholar who is well versed in the archaeology of Palestine. It has, however, certain limitations which may be due to its brief compass, but not wholly so.

Dr. Johnson rightly sees how crucial is the question of what was the attitude of Jesus to his nation's cause against the domination of heathen Rome. He notes the importance of the Zealot movement in Galilee, and he admits 'the gospels show, over and over again, that Jesus was acutely conscious of the political situation in Palestine'. But he seems convinced on *a priori* grounds that Jesus must have been a pacifist. This causes him to gloss over contrary evidence and to say nothing of the vital fact that the disciples were armed in Gethsemane and probably at other times also. It also compels him, significantly, to admit that the fact that the pacific Jesus was crucified as a revolutionary is 'one of the great paradoxes of history'.

Dr. Johnson convinces his readers of his sincerity by the frankness with which he will confess the matters which perplex him as a believing Christian. Thus he states that 'Our Lord's own conception of his work has been endlessly investigated and no one can present a solution that will command universal acceptance'. And he admits, 'We do not know, we never can know, just why he said so little about himself'. In the face of such sincerity one does not wish to criticise; however, surprise might be expressed that Dr. Johnson here has not concerned himself more with the very pertinent question of the transmission of the traditions about Jesus. And this reflection in turn leads one on to wonder why the author of this book has paid almost no attention to the crucial part that Paul had in interpreting the person and mission of Jesus in soteriological terms. It is accordingly significant that towards the end of his book, Dr. Johnson, after endeavouring to show that Christianity is 'rooted in history', is obliged to confess in regard to Paul's statement in Philippians II:5-11 that 'Here Christianity expresses itself in what is usually called myth that is, sacred story. It cannot be made subject to criticism, it can only be accepted or rejected'.

The Rise and Fall of the Individual, by W. P. Witcutt (S.P.C.K., London, 1958. 12s. 6d. Pp. 198).

It is difficult to know what to make of this little book. In fairness to the author it must be said that he sincerely believes that he has found the cause and (less clearly) the cure of the fundamental *malaise* of human nature. Briefly his thesis is to demonstrate the truth of Kierkegaard's assertion, which he quotes: 'The individual is above the race . . . that is Christianity'. He expands this oracular statement to mean, 'The individual is above the race in Christianity because the Christian does not exist for this world alone; he aims at immortality. That, I take it, was why man was given intelligence in the first place and separated from the brutes—in order that he might survive death'. The curious combination of assertion and assumption in these sentences, together with the disjointed syntax, is typical of the book, and it must surely tend to produce in many readers a sense of impatience that soon becomes reinforced by the author's succession of generalisations which so often ignore an abundance of contrary evidence. It must suffice to mention only a few facts which either fatally or seriously negate Mr. Witcutt's thesis. He maintains that, 'The priest-king is the only figure of ancient times who corresponds to the modern Individual'—such an assertion could only be made in ignorance of the wisdom literature of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt. In pursuance of his thesis the author states that 'Even the language developed within Christendom obeyed this form and reflected the advance of individuality—the "I" in Christian language is separated from the verb'. But already in the ancient Egyptian language, which is one of the earliest recorded languages of mankind, such a separation existed and the personal pronoun was well developed in form. One must also wonder how in dealing with the cultural significance of the concept of individuality the writer could feel that he might deal adequately with the Hindu and Buddhist treatment of the concept in six and a half pages and ignore completely the basic doctrines of *karma* and *samsara*! But what is surely the greatest cause for wonderment in this book is the fact that nowhere therin is the concept of individuality defined or any explanation given of the related concepts of 'soul', 'consciousness', or 'personality'. The problem of the emergence of a sense of individuality is far more complicated than Mr. Witcutt seems to realise, and the question of the supposed 'fall of the individual' must necessarily wait upon the proper evaluation of that problem.

Christianity among the Religions of the World, by A. Toynbee (Oxford University Press, 1958. 8s. 6d. Pp. 116).

Anything that Dr. Toynbee may say about Christianity in relation to the other religions of the world must certainly command attention, because it stems from an encyclopaedic knowledge of the history of mankind; moreover, in his other works Dr. Toynbee has given impressive evidence of his appreciation of the religious factor in the development of human culture. The present small book embodies lectures which were given in three centres of theological study in America, and it is described by its author as 'a discussion of the attitudes of Christians towards the followers of the other great living religions'.

For Dr. Toynbee the question of the relations between Christianity and the other great religions is not just one of academic interest, but it constitutes a world problem of supreme urgency. He sees what he calls 'the historic higher religions' facing the challenge of another, but pernicious, form of religion, namely, 'man's self-centred worship of himself', which finds practical expression in Nationalism and Communism. Against this threat, he thinks that these religions should now stand together 'in

preaching the supremely important negative belief that is common to them all. They all believe that man is not the highest spiritual presence in the universe'.

It is significant that Dr. Toynbee arrives at this negative definition of a common principle of belief among the higher religions after failing to find any satisfactory positive criteria by which these religions may be compared with each other. But in thus presenting this negative element in their doctrines of Man as a basis of common agreement among these religions, Dr. Toynbee appears to neglect the even more fundamental fact that the Christian and the Hindu-Buddhist evaluations of human nature and destiny differ essentially from each other. Another serious defect in Dr. Toynbee's argument is constituted by his failure to appreciate both the essential nature of Christian soteriology and its logic. Thus he rightly blames the intolerant arrogance which Christians have shown towards other religions, but, when he traces this 'Christian arrogance' to the sin of pride, he shows that he has failed to realise that, human weakness apart, this attitude is inspired by the logic of Christian soteriology. Whether Paul was right or not in proclaiming Jesus Christ the unique Saviour of mankind and the Crucifixion as God's only covenanted means of salvation, this Pauline soteriology has become the essential basis of both the Catholic and Protestant forms of Christianity. Within the terms of such a doctrine no other way of salvation for sinful mankind can be contemplated. This fact cannot be ignored; without the authority confirmed by this doctrine, Christianity has no *raison d'être*. For this reason too Dr. Toynbee's attempt on p. 109 to present the Buddhist concept of the *bodhisattva* as 'the vision of a self-sacrificing figure' similar to that of the Crucified Christ is misleading—the *bodhisattva* withheld himself from the attainment of *nirvana* to help others on the way to this goal; to the Christian 'there was no other good enough', except Christ, 'to pay the price of sin'.

These criticisms are not made with the intent to turn the readers of this journal from reading Dr. Toynbee's book. Indeed far to the contrary; because the reviewer would strongly recommend it to members of the Modern Churchmen's Union. It should certainly be read as a sincere attempt by one of the greatest living historians to deal with a matter of fundamental importance, but it should be read critically, so that the prestige of its author's reputation does not cause the issue to be prejudiced as capable of a solution less radical than its true nature entails.

Die Kindertaufe in der ersten vier Jahrhunderten, by J. Jeremias (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen u. Zürich, 1958. DM 13.50. Pp. 127).

Professor Jeremias has provided a truly excellent monograph on the long debated question of the justification of infant baptism. He collects a rich abundance of data relating to the custom during the first four centuries from New Testament times. Such a survey is timely, since recent study of certain relevant literary sources and archaeological discovery calls for a review of earlier opinion about the subject. Dr. Jeremias concludes that, during the period concerned, the practice of infant baptism received abundant theological justification, and the two most notable opponents of the practice, namely Tertullian and Gregory of Nazianzus, based their objections to it on other than theological grounds. In his search for archaeological evidence bearing on his theme, the author has been able to make what is virtually a discovery of unique significance both for the history of Christian symbolism and for the history of religions. When visiting the British Museum, his attention was taken by a diminutive pottery coffin (illustrated), containing the embalmed body of a young girl-child, which was of Egyptian origin and dated about 200 A.D. On the crudely anthropoid cover of the coffin the child is represented holding a lotus flower (a symbol of rebirth) and a cross with a looped stem. Not only does this coffin illustrate Origen's state-

ment about the antiquity of infant baptism in Egypt, but it undoubtedly provides the earliest evidence so far known of the cross as a symbol of the Christian faith. To the student of comparative religion it has further significance, for it indicates that the Christian symbol of the cross probably developed in Egypt out of the ancient *ankh*, the traditional sign of life so abundantly depicted in ancient Egyptian inconography; moreover, the representation of the child's head on the coffin shows (appended to the chin) the Puntite beard, which was a characteristic symbol of the ancient Osirian mortuary cult.

This monograph is true to the tradition of German scholarship in its careful documentation and full bibliographies. It is to be hoped that it will soon be made available in English translation.

Heiligengräber in Jesu Umwelt, by J. Jeremias. (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Göttingen u. Zürich, 1958. D.M. 15.80. Pp. 155, with illustrations and map).

This second monograph of Professor Jeremias may be commended for providing a valuable account of ideas and practices, current in the folk religion of Palestine in the time of Jesus, which are not recorded in the official literature, but which are of immense significance for the study of Christian Origins. Dr. Jeremias says that his aim is to illustrate the custom alluded to by Jesus in his condemnation of the Pharisees in Matt. 23, 29. He, accordingly, makes a survey of all relevant data concerning the contemporary Jewish cult of 'the graves of the saints'. His conclusion is that the contemporaries of Jesus believed that their great ancestors and heroes of their race were still actually dwelling in their tombs, and able to intercede and perform miracles for those who won their favour. The existence of such beliefs would, of course, suggest that the later Christian cult of saints may have derived from Jewish rather than from pagan prototypes. At the end of his study the author briefly appeals to the evidence which he has produced, as constituting powerful confirmation of the belief that the original disciples must have venerated the tomb in which Jesus had lain and so helped to preserve the memory of its location. But in his contention Dr. Jeremias curiously overlooks the point that he had earlier been concerned to establish, namely, that the tombs were venerated because it was thought that the dead still dwelt in some conscious manner within them. Would the disciples have venerated an 'empty tomb', except as a symbol of the Resurrection?

So much interesting and valuable material is gathered in this monograph that it too should be made available to English readers.

S. G. F. Brandon

The Protestant Ministry, by David T. Jenkins (Faber. 12s. 6d. Pp. 194).

This is a vigorous book, as one would expect from its author. The most important section for review is that which deals with Protestant thoughts on Episcopacy. It is stated that, in spite of all that can be said in favour of the Episcopalian form of ministry, 'It needs to be made clear that Protestantism remains unconvinced by claims that the "historic episcopate" is the distinctive and decisive link between the apostolic Church and the churches of our own day'. This is a conclusion which has found definite, if not overwhelming, concurrence in the recent General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and is widely held in Methodist circles, to mention two Churches with which Anglican discussions have taken place. It should cause us to reflect deeply on the future basis of Re-union between the Church of England and other Churches. Too much Anglican theology of the Ministry has advanced far beyond the tone and claims of Lightfoot's carefully balanced essay on 'The Christian Ministry'. Daniel Jenkins brings us back to a point nearer to Lightfoot and further

from post-Reformation Roman doctrine than many Anglicans seem to accept, from public utterances, which are constantly made.

Those in the Protestant Churches, who have rejected the notion of taking episcopacy into their systems, are not necessarily opposed to episcopacy, but only to the kind of episcopacy which is insisted upon in a certain vociferous quarter of the Church of England. It is a new version of the well-worn story of the difference between 'esse' and 'bene esse'. A last point to remember is that while an Anglican may distinguish between validity and spiritual effectiveness of ministerial orders, to those in the Free Churches the two are regarded as indistinguishable. This appears to them to indicate a certain degree of inconsistency in the Anglican attitude.

Language and Christian Belief, by John Wilson (MacMillan. 9s. 6d. Pp. xvi + 136).

This book is a study of Christian belief by means of modern linguistic philosophy, which has been too readily supposed to regard Christian language as 'non-sense' and therefore meaningless. In his introduction the author states that 'the days when some philosophers used to declare all religious and metaphysical statements to be 'meaningless' are now long past'. As a general statement of the present position in the world of philosophy, this is by no means the case. However, Mr. Wilson proceeds to demonstrate the meaning which Christians attach to the language which expresses their belief.

I think that the wider purpose of his book and his justification in writing it may have been expressed by Mr. Wilson, himself, in the following words on page 100, 'Trying to make religious doctrines of this (technical) kind square with modern epistemology is an enormous task; though it is a task which will have to be undertaken, if religion is to answer the criticisms which arise from it, and which will continue to arise until answered'. Mr. Wilson has here prepared the groundwork for further study. As he points out, the philosophical terminology which we still employ to express Christian belief is in several important instances out-dated and in need of revision. A closer examination of this problem, by one competent to do so, would be of inestimable value to all Christian people.

R. J. W. Bevan

On the Way, by Olive Wyon (S.C.M. 8s. 6d.).

Dr. Wyon shows the Christian life as a practice of prayer and activity and writes with her customary direct language and appreciation of every type of Christian devotion.

Church on Race in South Africa, edited by J. M. Paton (S.C.M. 8s. 6d.).

A reprint of the essential documents and papers relevant to the struggle of the Church in the racial conflict in South Africa.

The Many Fundamentalisms, by C. W. J. Bowles (S.P.C.K. 1s.).

A resumé of a sermon preached before the University of Cambridge analysing the various forms of prevalent fundamentalism and indicating pride as their common error. 'The basic assertion is identical in form: we have the truth of God, you have not' (p. 12).

The Living World of the Old Testament, by B. W. Anderson (Longmans. 30s. net).

This book forms a most valuable companion to the Old Testament for anyone who wishes to read it in the context of its period and the traditions which shaped the various books. It is a commentary which is always both illuminating and readable.